The “Blue Tsunami” and Strategic Stability: Chinese Commentary on the Midterms

Democratic friction and Trump’s lame-duck legacy

The midterms were flagged by Chinese analysts as a risk factor for the celebrated US–China “constructive relationship of strategic stability”, and—as one author notes—conventional wisdom suggests that Democratic control of both chambers of Congress is not a positive development for China.

However, their writings in the wake of the “blue tsunami” hold mixed interpretations of what the Democratic victory means for China.

They broadly share the US diagnosis that the vote was a referendum on Trump, and a rebuke to the Republicans rather than an endorsement of the Democrats. They read the Iran war, and the cost-of-living squeeze it fed, as Trump’s cardinal error. They are less certain on whether or not we have entered a post-Trump era—a few see one opening, others say the Republican Party is Trump’s party, while others still argue that Trump is diminished, but that Trumpism will outlast the man.

On the implications for China, the clearest consensus line is the reassurance that foreign policy remains the purview of the President. In a 2nd November interview preceding results but imagining a Democratic victory, Da Wei writes:

In US foreign policy, day-to-day diplomacy—or the diplomacy we typically observe in the media—falls primarily within the remit of the President or the executive branch… Therefore, regardless of the outcome of the mid-term elections, Mr Trump will remain President. My first point is that the mid-term elections do not have such a significant impact on US foreign policy or on US-China relations; there is no need to exaggerate their significance.

Many authors predict continuity for the same reason as Da Wei, that Democratic control of the legislature won’t disrupt Trump’s foreign policy agenda. As Wu Xinbo (吴心伯) explains in an interview report published on 5 November:

…the “steering wheel” of China policy remains in the hands of the White House. Foreign affairs and national security fall within the President’s powers; Congress, as the legislature, mainly plays a role of intervention and course-correction, and cannot set the direction of China policy. Whether Trump adjusts depends on which issues Congress presses on, and how hard. “If there’s no pressure, why would Trump adjust of his own accord?”

Others make a claim for continuity due to bipartisan consensus on China. Authors mostly make this argument about anti-China US policy, particularly technology controls, but several actually claim that there is also a US consensus on “strategic stability”. In some sense, Da Wei is one of them—he claims that the “mainstream view” in the US holds that China is both the US’ “greatest external challenge” and that the US “should not engage in comprehensive confrontation with China”.

Several authors also argue that instability is tempered by the US’ economic difficulties, for example, Zhang Yun in a reported account:

…despite potential points of conflict, the uncertainty surrounding US-China relations remains manageable, as the deep-seated economic interests driving Washington and Beijing towards greater stability will not be fundamentally altered by an election.

Many authors do concede that a Democratic congress might disrupt the smooth sailing of US–China relations—for instance, Wu Xinbo above, who admits that Trump may adjust course if the pressure is sufficient.

Liu Weidong, again in reported speech, is most explicit on this front, although he qualifies the point with the “consensus as stability” argument:

…with the Democrats now in control of Congress, the “divergence between the Executive and the Legislature” on China-related policies is likely to widen. The Democrats have long accused Trump of relaxing high-tech export controls and engaging in unprincipled deals for personal gain, thereby harming US interests. Having secured control of Congress, the Democrats will subject Trump’s approach towards China over the past two years to rigorous scrutiny and a thorough reckoning.

The Democrats, who place great importance on values such as democracy and human rights, will use these to pose new challenges to China, in contrast to Trump’s disregard for such issues. Despite these differences, both parties still share a basic consensus on maintaining strategic stability between China and the US and avoiding excessively intense confrontation.

Several authors express concern that the Democrats may instrumentalise China—that Trump’s broadly conciliatory China policy may be used against him. A few, including Liu Weidong, note the possibility of Trump conceding space on China policy as part of a bargaining position. For instance, Diao Daming:

On China–US relations, Trump may consider stabilising China–US relations to be the greatest legacy of his term, but in order to compromise with the Democrats and even some forces within the Republican Party, he will inevitably “let through” some negative China-related bills. The risks and challenges facing China–US relations will grow, but overall the relationship should remain stable.

And Zhu Zhengyu on export controls:

With the Democrats now controlling Congress, the conditions for such bills to gain cross-party support have improved. Although President Trump previously retained some flexibility to adjust technology exports during US-China trade negotiations, legislative action by Congress will make it more difficult for the White House to adjust relevant policies.

Taiwan is the clearest risk, or what Wu Xinbo calls the “biggest variable” for a domestically contested US–China relationship. Wu raises the possibility that the paused $14 billion arms package could be revived under congressional pressure and that Congress might push Trump to allow a Lai Ching-te transit, but he also makes a more striking observation:

In the past, [arms-sales decisions] were driven more by the geopolitical aim of containing the Chinese mainland and by arms manufacturers’ commercial interests; from now on they may become a tool of US domestic political struggle—when the Democrats are dissatisfied with Trump’s China policy, they can use arms sales to pressure him.

Generally though, authors tend to be dismissive of the disruptive potential of a Democratic Congress, which will simply create what Da Wei calls “a great deal of noise”.

Although several authors explore the prospect of Republicans distancing themselves from Trump after the midterms, only Mei Yang ties the defeat to Republican pressure on China policy:

Trump must also take into account political reactions within the Republican Party. The defeat in the midterm elections has not silenced the hardline voices on China within the party. With the Democrats set to take control of Congress, Trump is under greater pressure to stabilise his political base and prevent party members from attributing the electoral setback to his foreign policy not being tough enough.

The legacy question raised by Diao Daming is another recurrent theme. A number of authors, noting that Trump will be constrained domestically, and that he cannot run again, argue that he will look to cement his legacy on foreign policy. Da Wei is one of them, arguing:

…if the Republicans lose the mid-term elections, I believe, firstly, that Trump may actually have greater incentive to make greater efforts to stabilise China–US relations or build a constructive strategic stable relationship, in order to secure his ‘political legacy’.

Some warn of a possibly reckless lame duck foreign policy, but mostly with Iran in mind—the legacy reading is broadly positive for Beijing.

Overall, readings of what the midterm results mean for China are mixed, but if one were to ascribe an overall tone it would be sober, but not pessimistic. They expect little to change in substance, but, as Wu Xinbo puts it, “a Democratic-controlled Congress will increase the friction coefficient between the two countries”. Authors see some upsides, but they’re quick to hedge and return to the familiar, official baseline of insisting that China’s position depends more on its own strength rather than on who controls Congress.

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