Zhao Long is a senior research fellow and director of the Institute for International Strategic and Security Studies at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies. Across his recent writing on great-power relations and global governance, he has repeatedly returned to the question of what China’s growing international weight should require in terms of global responsibility and the provision of “public goods”. Within the implicit context of an “east is rising, and the west is declining” worldview, such discussion recalls the idea of the international instability introduced by a deficit in public goods provision as one power declines and another rises in the “Kindleberger Trap”.
Zhao has already set out how the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) might function as a vehicle for an agenda of public goods provision, proposing closer coordination between Eurasian transport corridors and a larger role for the organisation in piloting Chinese initiatives. In the following piece, he develops that agenda against Eurasia’s security landscape, locating the SCO within an unusually broad strategic geography in which Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the rest of Central Asia form a stabilising “core”, while the turbulent “periphery” extends through Ukraine and the Black Sea to the Middle East. This wider geography suggests serious ambition for the future scope of the SCO as an organisation for advancing integration across Eurasia, but also the challenges of coordinating between parties beset by mutual suspicion or outright conflict.
The SCO’s capacity to deliver concrete economic and security benefits therefore matters more than institutional scale alone. For Zhao, this means in practice using the SCO to connect major Eurasian transport corridors, expand green-energy and digital cooperation, strengthen public-health and crisis-response capacity, and develop new financial institutions such as the SCO Development Bank and a possible new development fund. Taken together, these measures are pitched to increase the indispensability of the SCO among its members, with China-Russia strategic coordination playing a particularly central role in advancing this vision.
— Cherry Yu
Key Points
Eurasia’s security landscape is characterised by “a stabilising [Central Asian] core and a turbulent periphery” [核心趋稳、外围动荡] extending through Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and a trend towards growing regional autonomy and multipolarity.
A widening deficit in public-goods provision is emerging alongside this, as climate, infrastructure, digital governance, public health and financing needs increasingly outpace existing institutional and regulatory capacity.
Eurasia’s growing array of regional mechanisms has expanded cooperation choices without necessarily strengthening governance capacity, as overlapping functions raise coordination costs.
The SCO is positioned to respond through three complementary normative, functional and institutional strengths: the “Shanghai Spirit” as a basis for political trust, security-development integration and inclusive cooperation across regional mechanisms.
Its next stage would combine community-building to consolidate consensus, “common modernisation” to broaden cooperation and institutional innovation to improve governance, extending the SCO’s role beyond regional stabilisation.
Community-building would link the SCO more closely with China-Central Asia mechanisms, extending cooperation in transport connectivity, industrial development and green growth.
Under “common modernisation”, stronger green, digital, financial and connectivity cooperation would expand regional public-goods provision, while more integrated overland corridors would strengthen Eurasian transport resilience.
As enlargement makes members’ interests more diverse, institutional innovation would preserve consensus on core questions while allowing flexible task-based cooperation on functional issues.
China-Russia coordination is central to this project, with both key members bearing responsibilities for regional stability and organisational development while helping position the SCO as a demonstration zone for global governance.
The SCO could also strengthen coordination beyond its membership through “peripheral dialogue” with regional mechanisms such as ASEAN and the Eurasian Economic Union.
The Scholar

Name: Zhao Long (赵隆)
Year of Birth: Not publicly confirmed
Position: Director and Senior Research Fellow, Institute for International Strategic and Security Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, China
Formerly: Deputy Director, Institute for Global Governance Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies; seconded to the Department of Treaty and Law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China (2015–2016)
Research Focus: Global Governance, International Law, Russian and Central Asian Studies, Arctic and Polar Affairs
Education: Bachelor’s degree in Jurisprudence, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Russia; MA in International Law, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Russia; PhD in Law, East China Normal University, China.
Experience Abroad: Visiting Scholar, German Council on Foreign Relations, Germany; Visiting Fellow, Norwegian Polar Institute, Norway (November–December 2014); Visiting Scholar, Center for Strategic and International Studies, United States (2018)

THE EVOLUTION OF THE EURASIAN ORDER AND THE SCO’S CHANGING GOVERNANCE ROLE
By Zhao Long (赵隆)
Published in Contemporary World, Issue 8, reposted by China’s Diplomacy in the New Era on 4 September 2026
Translated by Cherry Yu
(Illustration by ChatGPT)
As Eurasia’s security landscape becomes more differentiated, regional autonomy grows, development priorities shift and governance mechanisms diversify, regional countries face growing needs to better coordinate development and security, broaden the benefits of cooperation, and expand the provision of public goods. As President Xi Jinping has emphasised, “the Eurasian continent is our common home. Safeguarding its peace and development is the shared goal of countries both in the region and the world at large, with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) bearing important responsibilities in this regard”. He has further noted that “promoting the development and expansion of the SCO and strengthening its positive role will create strong momentum and new vitality for ensuring durable peace and common prosperity of the Eurasian continent and the whole world”. As the most representative comprehensive regional organisation on the Eurasian continent, the SCO now faces an important question about its future development. It needs to respond to the structural trends reshaping the Eurasian order, strengthen resilience through better strategic positioning and institutional design, align agenda-setting more effectively with diverse development needs, and translate its conceptual, functional and institutional advantages [理念、功能和制度优势] into governance capacity.
I. Structural Trends in the Evolution of the Eurasian Order
The Eurasian security landscape, development agenda and governance system are undergoing accelerated adjustment. Sources of stability are increasingly intertwined with uncertainty, internal dynamics coexist with external intervention, and traditional and non-traditional security risks are becoming deeply entangled. Overall, the evolution of the Eurasian order is characterised by five major trends.
First, the security landscape is characterised by “a stabilising core and a turbulent periphery” [核心趋稳、外围动荡]. On the one hand, interstate relations in Central Asia, regarded as the SCO’s “core region” [核心区], have entered a period of broad reconciliation and development. Positive progress has been made in resolving border disputes, water-allocation issues and territorial disagreements that have long hindered regional cooperation. In March 2025, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a border agreement and reached agreement on the joint management of border areas in the Fergana Valley. In the same month, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Treaty on the Junction Point of State Borders and the Khujand Declaration of Eternal Friendship, bringing more than three decades of border disputes to an end.
The Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia have become increasingly institutionalised. Regional states place considerable emphasis on safeguarding political security and regime stability and have developed broad consensus on combating the three forces of terrorism, separatism and extremism, strengthening border security, and tackling transnational crime.
In the South Caucasus, the focus is shifting from conflict management towards peacebuilding. In August 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan advanced a draft peace agreement, and reconstruction began in Nagorno-Karabakh, creating conditions for the region to move beyond its security and development challenges.
On the other hand, conflicts in Eurasia’s “peripheral regions” [外围区], including Eastern Europe and the Middle East, are producing growing spillover effects. The Ukraine crisis has dragged on, with Russia and Ukraine continuing offensive and defensive operations around energy facilities, transport hubs and critical military-industrial infrastructure, while the risks of further escalation continue to build. Strategic contestation between NATO and Russia is unfolding across the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea and Arctic waters, creating a new “arc of forward deterrence” [前沿威慑弧].
The United States and Israel have carried out military strikes against Iran, while the United States and Iran have imposed a “double blockade” affecting the Strait of Hormuz. Yemen’s Houthi forces have also announced a maritime embargo against Saudi Arabia, disrupting shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and across both the southern and northern Red Sea. According to UN Trade and Development, the Strait of Hormuz carries around 25% of global seaborne oil trade and approximately 19% of liquefied natural gas trade, while the Red Sea-Suez route accounts for around 12-15% of global seaborne trade and approximately 30% of global container shipping. Disruption to these two major routes has intensified volatility in global energy markets and supply chains.
Second, a stronger sense of strategic autonomy is emerging alongside shifts in how the major powers view Eurasia. As the world becomes more multipolar and the international balance of power continues to change, Eurasian states are placing greater emphasis on strategic autonomy. They are seeking to build a stronger sense of shared identity, deepen regional coordination and strategic alignment, and shape development agendas and governance rules that better reflect their own interests, while maintaining balanced relations with the major powers.
Central Asian states, for example, have developed a network of “Central Asia Five plus One” (“C5+1”) mechanisms with China, Russia, the United States, the European Union, Japan, South Korea and India. The Arab Gulf states use the Gulf Cooperation Council to coordinate interests and manage crises, while countries in the South Caucasus are exploring new models of regional connectivity. These subregions are gradually moving beyond their traditional role as arenas of geopolitical competition and becoming important actors with a degree of agenda-setting capacity and greater choice over institutional arrangements.
At the same time, the major powers are reassessing their own strategic approaches to Eurasia. Former US Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith and former Department of Defence official Lindsey Ford argued in Foreign Affairs that the Eurasian order is being reshaped, requiring Washington to reassess its strategy for sustaining American primacy in the region. They put forward ideas such as an “integrated strategy” and “cross-regional security”, calling for closer links between European and Asia-Pacific security frameworks to counterbalance the growing influence of major regional powers.
Russia is also rethinking the traditional conception of Eurasia as a sphere of strategic depth and security buffers, instead framing its vision of regional order around multipolarity and diversity. Russia and Belarus have jointly proposed the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century. The initiative calls for a more multipolar Eurasia and greater autonomy for states across the continent, stresses the diversity of civilisations and development paths, advocates a security architecture founded on equality and indivisible security, and promotes economic cooperation and regional connectivity. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has described Eurasia as “the geopolitical centre of the emerging multipolar world”, making multipolarity a central organising principle in Russia’s approach to shaping the regional order.
Third, security, development and governance needs are becoming increasingly intertwined, while the deficit in public-goods provision is widening. Non-traditional security challenges including climate change, security across the water-energy-food nexus, public health, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence governance are increasingly overlapping, driving greater regional demand for public goods such as cross-border infrastructure, green-energy cooperation and digital public infrastructure.
For example, Central Asia is rich in wind, solar and hydropower resources, and critical minerals, yet cross-border power grids, electricity-market integration, green finance and digital infrastructure remain relatively underdeveloped. Particular difficulties persist in balancing cross-border water management, hydropower development and environmental protection, while the region also lags well behind the Asia-Pacific in digital public infrastructure, rules governing cross-border data flows, cybersecurity cooperation and capacity for AI governance.
In South Asia, instability in Afghanistan and tensions between India and Pakistan continue to sustain significant risks from terrorism, extremism and transnational organised crime, imposing longstanding constraints on regional connectivity, cross-border investment and major infrastructure projects. In West Asia (the Middle East), conflict has undermined the stability of energy transport and supply chains, disrupted the green-transition strategies of some states, and eroded confidence in the regional security environment, prompting investors to reassess their investment plans.
Although the South Caucasus is transitioning from conflict towards development-oriented governance, the construction of cross-border transport hubs, including the Zangezur Corridor, requires sustained, large-scale investment and depends heavily on further progress in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, as well as coordination among major powers within and beyond the region. The gap between growing development needs and the provision of regional public goods is becoming increasingly apparent.
Fourth, the strategic value and development logic of overland corridors are undergoing a fundamental shift. Protracted geopolitical conflicts and disruption to some maritime routes have prompted countries not only to expand the capacity of major Eurasian overland corridors, but also to develop supplementary multimodal feeder routes in order to reduce excessive dependence on any single route.
The China-Europe Railway Express has become an important pillar of Eurasian connectivity. The number of annual services rose from 1,702 in 2016 to 20,022 in 2025, and 129 Chinese cities are now connected by these services to more than 230 cities across 26 European countries. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway has also reached around 17% completion. Once finished, it is expected to establish a transport link from western China to Uzbekistan via Kyrgyzstan, further strengthening the China-Central Asia-West Asia overland transport network.
Development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), linking China, Central Asia, the Caucasus, Türkiye and Europe, has accelerated. Freight volumes reached around 4.5 million tonnes in 2024, more than five times the 800,000 tonnes recorded in 2020. Although freight volume declined slightly year-on-year in 2025 owing to factors such as transport structure and route conditions, container traffic grew rapidly to about 77,000 TEUs and is expected to reach 300,000 TEUs by 2030.
The International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), linking Russia, Iran, India, Azerbaijan, Central Asia and Europe, has attracted growing attention. Russia and Iran have begun surveying the 162-kilometre Rasht-Astara railway section, while Russia’s Port of Makhachkala plans to open a route linking Kyrgyzstan via Turkmenbashi Port in Turkmenistan and the Caspian Sea. This would provide an additional option for transporting Chinese goods through Central Asia.
Connectivity is now extending beyond physical infrastructure to encompass greater coordination on rules, standards and digital governance. For instance, parties involved in the TITR have made logistics digitalisation a priority for 2026. Planned measures include an electronic documentation system incorporating digital signatures and mechanisms for data exchange between customs authorities and other stakeholders.
Fifth, regional governance mechanisms are becoming more diverse, making coordination and integration an increasingly important task. At present, a multi-layered governance architecture has taken shape across Eurasia, comprising the SCO, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) programme, and the “C5+1” mechanisms.
These mechanisms serve different functions. The SCO provides a comprehensive platform for maintaining regional security and stability, deepening political mutual trust, and coordinating security and development. The EAEU focuses on customs coordination, the development of a common market and regional economic integration. The Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia seek to strengthen a shared regional identity among Central Asian states and improve policy coordination, while CAREC focuses on cross-border transport, energy cooperation, trade facilitation and digital connectivity.
At the same time, various “C5+1” cooperation mechanisms have developed rapidly. At the second China-Central Asia Summit in 2025, the parties signed the Declaration of Astana and the Treaty of Permanent Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation, and produced 110 cooperation outcomes spanning political mutual trust, security, trade and investment, and connectivity. At the inaugural EU-Central Asia Summit, the two sides established a strategic partnership and announced a EUR12 billion investment framework under the Global Gateway initiative to support cooperation on the TITR, critical minerals and green energy. The US-Central Asia Summit focused on critical-mineral development, energy cooperation and supply-chain restructuring, and the second Russia-Central Asia Summit adopted a Joint Action Plan for 2025-2027, aimed at institutionalising cooperation on transport corridors, logistics networks and labour markets.
However, an increase in regional governance mechanisms does not necessarily translate into stronger governance capacity. While the coexistence of multiple mechanisms gives regional states a wider range of options for cooperation and can strengthen the inclusiveness and resilience of regional governance, they have yet to form a highly coordinated and functionally complementary “regime complex” [机制复合体]. Overlaps in the functions and agendas of different mechanisms raise the costs of policy coordination, while the tendency to cast some of them in overly geopolitical terms risks intensifying competition over rules and deepening institutional fragmentation.
II. An “Anchor of Stability” for Security and Development across Eurasia
As Eurasia undergoes a reconfiguration of its security landscape, regional states pursue greater strategic autonomy, security and development agendas converge more closely, and regional governance mechanisms become increasingly diverse. These changes are pushing regional governance beyond a traditional focus on security towards a more comprehensive approach that brings together security, common development and institution-building. Over its 25-year history, the SCO has consistently pursued common security and common development, while developing distinctive strengths in maintaining regional peace and stability, deepening political mutual trust, promoting economic cooperation and fostering cultural exchange.
First, the SCO draws on the “Shanghai Spirit” [上海精神] to build political mutual trust, giving it a distinctive normative advantage [理念优势]. As the most geographically extensive and populous comprehensive regional organisation in Eurasia, the SCO has consistently upheld the “Shanghai Spirit” of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for cultural diversity and the pursuit of common development. This approach moves beyond the traditional logic of military alliances and bloc politics, respects member states’ choices of development paths and foreign policies suited to their own national circumstances, rejects ideological dividing lines, and does not base cooperation on targeting or excluding third parties. Nor does it compel members to “choose sides” in major-power competition. In this way, the SCO offers an institutional model for peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation among countries with different political systems, civilisations and levels of development.
Eurasia spans a vast geographical area and encompasses significant differences in history, culture, political systems and levels of economic development. States across the continent therefore have diverse priorities in security, development and foreign policy. By recognising differences and accommodating diversity, the SCO brings the interests of different countries into a framework of institutionalised consultation [制度性对话], demonstrating the distinctive value of a non-Western model of regional cooperation.
Its Council of Heads of State, Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers), ministerial meetings and Secretariat provide stable channels for maintaining high-level strategic communication, managing crises and advancing practical cooperation. Although differences remain among member states and partners over borders, security, economic interests and historical legacies, the SCO has continued to promote dialogue, political coordination and gradual cooperation in support of overall regional stability.
In recent years, the SCO’s role in political coordination around regional security flashpoints has become more prominent. For example, following the 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, the SCO Tianjin Summit gave the leaders of both countries an important opportunity to remain in contact within a multilateral framework and to prevent tensions from escalating further or spilling over. This illustrates that the SCO is not only a platform for economic, cultural and security cooperation, but also an important political channel for maintaining strategic communication and containing escalation when regional tensions intensify. Its role is not to replace bilateral diplomacy or other regional security mechanisms, but to provide additional space for communication and de-escalation. As demand grows across the region for greater strategic autonomy, cooperation on an equal footing and more inclusive governance, the SCO’s distinctive advantages are likely to become increasingly apparent.
Second, the SCO has a functional advantage in providing public goods through the integration of security and development. As traditional and non-traditional security risks become increasingly intertwined, governance needs across Eurasia are shifting from a primary focus on maintaining regional stability towards a more comprehensive approach that coordinates security, development and governance.
Where traditional security organisations tend to prioritise military cooperation and economic organisations trade and investment, the SCO seeks to integrate the two within a governance model that treats security and development as mutually reinforcing, with security providing the conditions for development [安全保障发展] and development strengthening the foundations of long-term security [发展巩固安全].
In recent years, the SCO has broadened the scope of its security cooperation from confidence-building in border areas and efforts to combat the “three forces” of terrorism, separatism and extremism to a wider range of non-traditional security fields, including counterterrorism law enforcement, cybersecurity, counter-narcotics, biosecurity, disaster prevention and mitigation, and public health. It has strengthened information-sharing, joint operations and capacity-building among member states, driving a shift in security governance from responding to individual threats towards preventing complex and interconnected risks.
Development cooperation has likewise expanded beyond transport, energy resources and trade facilitation into emerging areas such as the digital economy, green transition, scientific and technological innovation, and industrial and supply-chain cooperation. By strengthening economic resilience, improving the conditions for development and deepening institutional connectivity, the SCO is increasingly seeking to address sources of insecurity through development cooperation.
During the Tianjin Summit, China worked in its capacity as the rotating chair to deepen the SCO’s integration of security and development. In the security sphere, China promoted the inauguration of four security centres: the Universal Centre for Countering Security Challenges and Threats and its Information Security Centre, the Centre for Countering International Organised Crime, and the SCO Anti-Drug Centre, with the aim of improving capacity to address complex security challenges. [Note: The “four security centres” are not four separate institutions. The Universal Centre for Countering Security Challenges, built on the SCO’s existing Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure in Tashkent, incorporates the Information Security Centre and has the Centre for Countering International Organised Crime in Bishkek as a branch. The Anti-Narcotics Centre was established separately as a permanent specialised body.]
In the development sphere, three China-SCO cooperation platforms were established in energy, green industry and the digital economy, together with three cooperation centres for scientific and technological innovation, higher education, and vocational and technical education. Five statements were issued to promote cooperation on sustainable energy development, green industry, the digital economy, artificial intelligence, and scientific and technological innovation, alongside the continued implementation of the action plan for the high-quality development of economic and trade cooperation.
Most importantly, a political decision was taken to establish an SCO Development Bank to provide financing for major cooperation projects among member states and strengthen the provision of regional financial public goods. By advancing security and development in a coordinated manner, the SCO has accumulated useful experience in exploring a non-Western model of regional governance.
Third, the SCO has an institutional advantage in promoting governance innovation through inclusive cooperation. As regional cooperation increasingly takes shape across multiple levels, actors and platforms, the SCO has continued to advocate an open approach to cooperation, seeking complementary and mutually reinforcing relationships with other regional mechanisms and international organisations and exploring a model of governance that moves from institutional coexistence towards greater coordination.
The SCO has strengthened cooperation with the United Nations and other relevant international organisations, maintained constructive engagement with regional governance platforms including the China-Central Asia mechanism, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia, and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, while also exploring greater synergy with initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Greater Eurasian Partnership.
Compared with other regional cooperation platforms, the SCO combines security, development and cultural cooperation within a single framework. Its members and partners span East Asia, Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East, giving the organisation a distinctive ability to connect different parts of Eurasia and countries at different stages of development. Its diverse membership and consensus-based decision-making mechanism enable it to accommodate the interests of countries from different regions and at different levels of development, while allowing it to serve as a hub for coordinating rules, aligning policies and providing regional public goods.
Overall, the SCO’s growing institutional strengths and appeal derive not only from the continued expansion of its membership and partnerships and the widening scope of cooperation, but more fundamentally from its efforts to develop a model of regional cooperation distinct from military alliances, bloc politics and zero-sum competition. This model combines political mutual trust with practical cooperation, links security cooperation with common development, and brings together openness and inclusiveness with mutual benefit and win-win outcomes.
Against the backdrop of profound changes in the Eurasian order and rising demands on regional governance, the SCO has the potential to strengthen its contribution by refining its strategic positioning, broadening its cooperative functions and improving governance effectiveness. In doing so, it could provide important support for safeguarding regional security, advancing peace and development, addressing global governance challenges, and contributing to a more just and equitable international order.
III. Guiding Principles and Practical Pathways for the SCO’s High-Quality Development
As the SCO enters a new stage of high-quality development marked by greater institutional effectiveness, stronger resilience in cooperation and growing regional and international influence, it needs to strengthen consensus among member states by fostering a shared sense of community, widen the scope for cooperation through common modernisation [共同现代化], and improve governance effectiveness through institutional innovation. In doing so, the organisation can gradually evolve from a guardian of regional stability into a leading platform for collaborative governance and a provider of regional public goods.
First, promote closer coordination between the building of an SCO community with a shared future and a China-Central Asia community with a shared future. As regional development concepts, governance models and approaches to cooperation undergo profound change, fostering a stronger sense of community has become an important normative foundation for long-term regional stability and common development.
China’s proposals to build an SCO community with a shared future and a China-Central Asia community with a shared future are both a response to the shared aspirations of countries in the region and a practical exploration of new forms of regional cooperation and common modernisation. In normative terms, the “Shanghai Spirit”—with its emphasis on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for cultural diversity and the pursuit of common development—closely aligns with the “China-Central Asia Spirit”, which stresses mutual respect, mutual trust, mutual benefit and mutual assistance, alongside advancing common modernisation through high-quality development. Together, they reflect a commitment to cooperation on an equal footing, openness and inclusiveness, and common development among countries with different cultures, political systems and levels of development.
The two communities with a shared future should be advanced in a more coordinated and mutually reinforcing manner across their geographical configuration, functional roles and practical cooperation, creating a virtuous cycle in which regional practice contributes to broader innovation in governance.
On the one hand, as an important multilateral platform spanning several subregions of Eurasia, the SCO can further draw on the strengths of a comprehensive regional cooperation mechanism to provide broader institutional space and multilateral support for building a China-Central Asia community with a shared future. By deepening institutional cooperation in security, economic coordination and cultural exchange, the experience gained through China-Central Asia cooperation in areas such as connectivity, industrial cooperation, green development and common modernisation can be translated into regional public goods and extended across a wider geographical and institutional setting.
On the other hand, efforts to build a China-Central Asia community with a shared future can draw on the convergence of interests and complementarity in development to serve as a platform for piloting and advancing cooperation that can subsequently be extended through the SCO, helping to strengthen its development role and broaden the scope and substance of its cooperation. With the building of the two communities with a shared future serving as an important driver, the principles of common security, common development and common modernisation can be translated into concrete mechanisms for cooperation. Stronger policy coordination, deeper integration of interests and closer people-to-people ties can in turn reinforce the political and social foundations of regional peace and stability.
Second, focus on common modernisation and expand the provision of public goods in green development, digital cooperation and connectivity. Modernisation is a shared development goal for Eurasian countries and an important avenue through which the SCO can generate greater dividends from cooperation. As the green transition, digital transformation and the restructuring of supply chains accelerate, regional demand will continue to grow for public goods including cross-border infrastructure, green energy, digital governance, scientific and technological innovation, and financial support. The SCO should respond to these trends by broadening the focus of cooperation beyond traditional project development towards a more comprehensive model encompassing infrastructure, regulatory coordination, capacity-building and institutional provision, using common modernisation to foster new sources of momentum for regional development.
In green development, cooperation should be strengthened in ecological protection, climate adaptation and green energy, while exploring longer-term cooperation in renewable-energy development, the application of green technologies and the optimisation of energy corridors. In the digital sphere, greater coordination is needed on rules governing digital customs, digital public infrastructure, cross-border data flows and artificial intelligence, enabling digital technologies to support industrial upgrading and better public services and allowing the digital economy to become a new source of regional growth and innovation. In connectivity, greater complementarity should be developed between corridors such as the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway, the TITR and the INSTC, alongside deeper institutional connectivity through logistics rules, digital customs clearance and industrial supply-chain coordination, strengthening the resilience of Eurasia’s transport corridors.
The SCO should further strengthen the provision of financial public goods to support common modernisation. As major cooperation projects increase in scale, limited access to financing and the shortage of suitable financial instruments are becoming significant obstacles to deeper regional cooperation. In addition to accelerating the establishment and operationalisation of the SCO Development Bank, the organisation could consider establishing an SCO Development Fund and developing a broader range of financing platforms for infrastructure, green development, the digital economy, and scientific and technological innovation. It could also expand local-currency settlement, strengthen connectivity between financial infrastructures, and deepen investment and financing cooperation, providing member states with more sustainable financial support for common development.
Third, balance the principle of consensus with the need for greater effectiveness, and move from consensus-based cooperation [共识型合作] towards action-oriented governance [行动型治理]. As the organisation expands, the interests and priorities of its members are becoming increasingly diverse, while disagreements among individual member states on particular issues can impede both decision-making and collective action. Future development will therefore require stronger political cohesion alongside greater governance effectiveness.
Consensus remains an essential institutional foundation for maintaining mutual trust among member states and ensuring their equal participation, and should continue to serve as a core political principle of the organisation. At the same time, more flexible forms of consultation and cooperation could be developed according to the nature of the issue and the requirements of cooperation. One approach would be to distinguish between “core issues” [核心议题] and “functional issues” [一般议题]: consensus would continue to apply to core matters such as the organisation’s institutional structure and enlargement, while more flexible task forces or working groups could be established for areas such as connectivity, the digital economy, green development, disaster prevention and mitigation, and public health, taking account of the willingness and capabilities of individual member states.
The SCO Secretariat and Secretary-General could also be given greater institutional authority in areas such as crisis response and project coordination, strengthening their capacity for overall coordination and implementation. As membership grows and cooperation broadens, the emphasis should gradually shift from forging consensus to coordinating action around agreed priorities, allowing the SCO to convert its growing scale into stronger governance capacity.
Fourth, strengthen the guiding role of the “core region” and deepen coordination among key member states, while exploring effective models of regional and global governance based on broad participation. Central Asia should further strengthen its exemplary role as the SCO’s “core region”, drawing on the experience its states have gained through independent regional coordination, consultation on an equal footing and development-oriented cooperation and translating this experience into governance practices that the SCO can draw on. This would help develop more mature models of regional cooperation in areas such as security coordination, economic cooperation and development governance.
As important members of the SCO, China and Russia bear significant responsibilities for maintaining regional stability, advancing security cooperation and supporting the organisation’s development. The two countries can work together to foster a clearer understanding among member states that cooperation within the SCO is not centred on regional dominance or influence, but on jointly addressing the security, development and governance challenges facing the region and the wider world. China-Russia strategic coordination can also focus on upholding the international system centred on the United Nations, safeguarding international fairness and justice, and encouraging all parties to develop a demonstration zone for global governance.
At the same time, agenda coordination between the SCO and the China-Central Asia mechanism should be strengthened to develop complementary advantages in connectivity, the digital economy, green development and cultural exchange. The SCO could also explore forms of “peripheral dialogue” [外围对话] with regional mechanisms such as ASEAN, the Eurasian Economic Union and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia. While preserving the independence of each mechanism, such dialogue could promote functional complementarity and mutually reinforcing strengths, while drawing on their institutional experience in areas such as consultative decision-making and the formulation of medium- and long-term objectives to better address member states’ concerns.
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