What a difference a couple of weeks makes. Earlier in the month, Chen Dingding’s suggestion that the current conflict might present opportunities was censored after publication, suggesting Beijing might be uncomfortable with such commentary. But here we have a nascent policy proposal. Is Beijing now more comfortable with allowing this?
"Condemning Iran’s “weaponisation” [武器化] of the Strait while ignoring Western weaponisation of semiconductors, supply chains and trade corridors applies a double standard that fails to withstand scrutiny." I think this is a bit of a categorical error. WHat Sinification mentions of things weaponised by the west have little to do with Iran and the weaponisation of the straits of Hormuz. What would have been a more apt comparison would have been a map pit the location of all US military bases in the Persian Gulf and surroundings as well as in proximity to Iran. Plus, point #3 misses to specify that Iran's was a reactive action, after being attacked militaryly twice in less than a year by US/Israel and once economically and via proxy internally at the end of Dec 2025.
What a difference a couple of weeks makes. Earlier in the month, Chen Dingding’s suggestion that the current conflict might present opportunities was censored after publication, suggesting Beijing might be uncomfortable with such commentary. But here we have a nascent policy proposal. Is Beijing now more comfortable with allowing this?
Indeed, however it might also be the case that the war profiting sentiment was what made Chen's post unacceptable.
"Condemning Iran’s “weaponisation” [武器化] of the Strait while ignoring Western weaponisation of semiconductors, supply chains and trade corridors applies a double standard that fails to withstand scrutiny." I think this is a bit of a categorical error. WHat Sinification mentions of things weaponised by the west have little to do with Iran and the weaponisation of the straits of Hormuz. What would have been a more apt comparison would have been a map pit the location of all US military bases in the Persian Gulf and surroundings as well as in proximity to Iran. Plus, point #3 misses to specify that Iran's was a reactive action, after being attacked militaryly twice in less than a year by US/Israel and once economically and via proxy internally at the end of Dec 2025.
Just to be clear, the comparison is the author's, not our own!
A leader doesn’t just do things, it needs to be seen doing things.