"In this crisis, the United States is trying to wear down its Asian rivals at the lowest possible cost, and Iran is trying to turn the Strait into a cash machine."
I think this piece is valuable because it gets one big strategic point right: for a country like China, the real issue is not whether it can technically settle payments in RMB, but whether it can preserve non-discriminatory, predictable, low-friction passage through critical maritime chokepoints. In that sense, the article is absolutely right to warn against confusing payment convenience with strategic gain. A payment channel is not the same thing as a legal right, and financial settlement is not the same thing as durable access.
I also strongly agree with the article’s concern about precedent. If a major chokepoint like Hormuz becomes normalized as a place where political screening, ad hoc charges, and conditional passage are tolerated, the long-term damage goes far beyond one episode of higher shipping costs. It would mean that the rules governing global trade arteries become more contingent, more coercive, and more vulnerable to strategic manipulation. For China, as a manufacturing superpower deeply dependent on stable maritime flows, that is clearly a long-term problem.
That said, I think the article becomes less convincing when it moves from identifying a real strategic danger to describing it almost as an already consolidated long-term equilibrium. The risk is real, but the structure is not yet fully formed. What we are seeing still looks more like a highly unstable crisis, a coercive test, and a fluid bargaining environment than a mature and durable new order. In other words, the article is strongest on the principle, but somewhat too certain on the degree of strategic consolidation already achieved.
I would add one more boundary condition. China’s real-world response is unlikely to be binary. It is unlikely to simply “accept” such a system, but it is also unlikely to rely on pure legal resistance alone if immediate energy security and shipping stability are at stake. More likely, China would operate in a gray zone: not legally endorsing the practice, not politically legitimizing it, but potentially using temporary commercial workarounds while accelerating diversification, buffers, and alternative supply routes. That may be less morally clean, but it is often how large states actually behave under high-pressure external shocks.
So my overall view is this: the article is right to insist that China must think in terms of long-term rules, not short-term transactional convenience. That is its strongest contribution. But it goes a bit too far when it treats a still-volatile crisis as if it has already crystallized into a stable strategic architecture. The warning is important. The degree of closure is overstated.
The most interesting aspect (to me), is Ye’s assertion that the US’s blockade is an element of some “West Asia” strategy to economically strangle East Asian countries (and specifically China). Yes, the disruption of Gulf oil supply creates challenges to Beijing, but is significantly more devastating to US allies Japan, South Korea, and Philippines. Moreover, to suggest that the US action is a deliberate element of ANY well-considered US regional grand strategy is to grant the Trump administration a level of strategic forethought that no reasonable observer would grant. Yes, the US action against Iran-originated shipments does in fact harm China more than any other nation. But Washington presumably would not have implemented its blockade if Tehran had not first threatened the shipments coming from other Gulf nations. The US move was a REaction rather than part of a grand strategy. (As an aside, if the current administration has ANY grand strategy, I’d love to see it.) Second, it’s interesting that he points to the precedence (if allowed to stand) that might be used in the Strait of Malacca but fails to mention that it might also provide a similar precedent for the Strait of Taiwan.
Yes, I found the lumping of Japan, South Korea, and China all as objects of the strategy very curious too... It's not clear whether, in his reading, US allies are bystanders caught in fire directed at China, or whether the US intends to target East Asian industrial powers as a group. And separately, I also tend to be rather unsympathetic to "5D chess against China" type readings of Trump's actions. Those theories just don't hang together and the mental gymnastics required to thread a narrative of strategic intent through all of Trump's foreign policy decisions is quite absurd. In my experience, Chinese commentators are usually quite generous in ascribing grand strategy to Trump, but there's been less of that around Iran, compared to analysis of NSS and Venezuela, perhaps because it's a much more difficult feat. On Taiwan - yes, elephant in the room, but not surprised it didn't get a mention!
Jacob, I wonder if Chinese commentators are exhibiting generosity or whether there’s an effort (orchestrated or not) to emphasize Trump’s blatant disregard for international norms and predatory efforts against adversaries and allies alike? By comparison, Beijing wants to appear (at least) as a paragon of steadiness and reliability. Just a thought….
I think this piece is valuable because it gets one big strategic point right: for a country like China, the real issue is not whether it can technically settle payments in RMB, but whether it can preserve non-discriminatory, predictable, low-friction passage through critical maritime chokepoints. In that sense, the article is absolutely right to warn against confusing payment convenience with strategic gain. A payment channel is not the same thing as a legal right, and financial settlement is not the same thing as durable access.
I also strongly agree with the article’s concern about precedent. If a major chokepoint like Hormuz becomes normalized as a place where political screening, ad hoc charges, and conditional passage are tolerated, the long-term damage goes far beyond one episode of higher shipping costs. It would mean that the rules governing global trade arteries become more contingent, more coercive, and more vulnerable to strategic manipulation. For China, as a manufacturing superpower deeply dependent on stable maritime flows, that is clearly a long-term problem.
That said, I think the article becomes less convincing when it moves from identifying a real strategic danger to describing it almost as an already consolidated long-term equilibrium. The risk is real, but the structure is not yet fully formed. What we are seeing still looks more like a highly unstable crisis, a coercive test, and a fluid bargaining environment than a mature and durable new order. In other words, the article is strongest on the principle, but somewhat too certain on the degree of strategic consolidation already achieved.
I would add one more boundary condition. China’s real-world response is unlikely to be binary. It is unlikely to simply “accept” such a system, but it is also unlikely to rely on pure legal resistance alone if immediate energy security and shipping stability are at stake. More likely, China would operate in a gray zone: not legally endorsing the practice, not politically legitimizing it, but potentially using temporary commercial workarounds while accelerating diversification, buffers, and alternative supply routes. That may be less morally clean, but it is often how large states actually behave under high-pressure external shocks.
So my overall view is this: the article is right to insist that China must think in terms of long-term rules, not short-term transactional convenience. That is its strongest contribution. But it goes a bit too far when it treats a still-volatile crisis as if it has already crystallized into a stable strategic architecture. The warning is important. The degree of closure is overstated.
The most interesting aspect (to me), is Ye’s assertion that the US’s blockade is an element of some “West Asia” strategy to economically strangle East Asian countries (and specifically China). Yes, the disruption of Gulf oil supply creates challenges to Beijing, but is significantly more devastating to US allies Japan, South Korea, and Philippines. Moreover, to suggest that the US action is a deliberate element of ANY well-considered US regional grand strategy is to grant the Trump administration a level of strategic forethought that no reasonable observer would grant. Yes, the US action against Iran-originated shipments does in fact harm China more than any other nation. But Washington presumably would not have implemented its blockade if Tehran had not first threatened the shipments coming from other Gulf nations. The US move was a REaction rather than part of a grand strategy. (As an aside, if the current administration has ANY grand strategy, I’d love to see it.) Second, it’s interesting that he points to the precedence (if allowed to stand) that might be used in the Strait of Malacca but fails to mention that it might also provide a similar precedent for the Strait of Taiwan.
Yes, I found the lumping of Japan, South Korea, and China all as objects of the strategy very curious too... It's not clear whether, in his reading, US allies are bystanders caught in fire directed at China, or whether the US intends to target East Asian industrial powers as a group. And separately, I also tend to be rather unsympathetic to "5D chess against China" type readings of Trump's actions. Those theories just don't hang together and the mental gymnastics required to thread a narrative of strategic intent through all of Trump's foreign policy decisions is quite absurd. In my experience, Chinese commentators are usually quite generous in ascribing grand strategy to Trump, but there's been less of that around Iran, compared to analysis of NSS and Venezuela, perhaps because it's a much more difficult feat. On Taiwan - yes, elephant in the room, but not surprised it didn't get a mention!
Jacob, I wonder if Chinese commentators are exhibiting generosity or whether there’s an effort (orchestrated or not) to emphasize Trump’s blatant disregard for international norms and predatory efforts against adversaries and allies alike? By comparison, Beijing wants to appear (at least) as a paragon of steadiness and reliability. Just a thought….