Zhang Jian on China, the EU and Russia "De-Risking" from the US

"There is no effective coordination or cooperation among them, but on some issues this has objectively produced the policy effect of a collective China–Europe–Russia response to the United States."

Despite official PRC discourse formally disavowing balance-of-power and bloc politics, the idiom of geopolitical balancing runs deep in Chinese strategic thought.

The Three Kingdoms remains the obvious shorthand for the US–China–Russia triangle that recurs across Chinese writing, but in today’s piece, Zhang Jian (张健) includes Europe in the strategic calculus—a framing that might be welcome in Brussels, which is habitually overlooked as an independent power by Chinese analysis.

Europeans may find Zhang’s analysis itself less agreeable, not least the claim that Europe and Russia’s positions have “reversed”, with Russia’s improving. Readers may also feel that Zhang overstates European convergence with Russian and Chinese positions on “de-risking” from America.

However, the piece exemplifies a wider tendency in Chinese commentary to portray Trump’s second term as geopolitically favourable to Beijing. Many Chinese analysts now see China as occupying a relatively privileged position in global power politics: Russia is weakened and dependent, while Trump has strained US alliances and came to Beijing seeking accommodation after a trade war China believes it won.

That this argument comes from a vice-president of CICIR, the Ministry of State Security’s main research institute, is significant. Zhang turns “de-risking” back on the United States, arguing that China, Russia and Europe are simultaneously seeking to reduce exposure to US power. He folds Europe’s strategic autonomy into China’s own geopolitical opportunity—euro internationalisation, the digital euro and European discomfort with US unilateralism are presented as forces that can help constrain dollar hegemony, weaken bloc politics and open new space for China–Europe cooperation on global governance.

His reading is a provocative one, but it demonstrates how plainly many Chinese analysts now see opportunity in a more fragmented West.

— Jacob Mardell

Key Points

1. The United States now finds itself in opposition to China, Europe and Russia alike; simultaneous efforts by all three to “de-risk” from the US are unprecedented.

2. Europe was in a relatively favourable position regarding Russia when it could count on US support. Since Trump’s return, Europe’s position has deteriorated, while Russia’s has improved markedly.

3. Europe is simultaneously pursuing policies that treat China, the United States and Russia alike as adversaries, while its actual pressure on Russia can no longer keep pace with its rhetoric.

4. Russia–US relations have improved, with Washington increasingly viewing the Russia–Ukraine conflict from Moscow’s standpoint and no longer treating Russia as a direct security threat.

5. China’s position in the four-way interaction among China, the United States, Europe and Russia has improved markedly compared with Trump’s first term and the Biden administration.

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6. The intensity of China–US confrontation has declined and the bilateral relationship has gained a degree of certainty through the new framing of a “constructive relationship of strategic stability”.

7. US–Europe coordination on China has weakened. Although the US remains the main third-party obstacle to China–Europe relations, it has also become a factor promoting China–Europe cooperation.

8. As Europe recognises Ukraine’s predicament and the need for a ceasefire, it has begun to see China’s role differently, weakening the influence of the US and Europe on Sino-Russian ties.

9. Although there is no effective coordination among them, China, Europe and Russia are producing a collective policy effect against US hegemony, including through the expansion of euro internationalisation, the digital euro and local-currency settlement.

10. Europe’s greater autonomy and the United States’ “de-superpowering” [去超级] will advance multipolarity, while China and Europe may gain more space for cooperation on global governance.

The Scholar

Name: Zhang Jian (张健)
Position: Vice President and Research Professor, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
Previously: Deputy Director, Institute of European Studies, CICIR; Director, Institute of European Studies, CICIR
Other: Standing Council Member, Chinese Association for European Studies (CAES)
Research focus: European integration; EU external relations; EU–US relations; China–EU relations
Education: PhD (History), Wuhan University (2003)

NEW DYNAMICS IN CHINA–US–EUROPE–RUSSIA INTERACTIONS AND THEIR GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
Zhang Jian (张健)
Published in Contemporary International Relations《现代国际关系》, 2026, no. 5.
This translation is based on the abridged version published by CICIR’s WeChat account on 17 June 2026.
Lightly edited machine translation
(Illustration by ChatGPT)

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I. China, Europe and Russia “De-risk” from the United States

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Unlike during the Biden administration, the United States today finds itself in opposition to China, Europe and Russia alike. Although the reasons differ and the degree varies, all three need to reduce their dependence on the United States.

Russia’s process of “de-Americanisation” [去美化] has long been under way and has continued to gather pace. Following the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, the United States and Europe imposed financial sanctions on Russia, prompting Russia to begin this process. Since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict in 2022, Russia’s financial system has undergone further “de-Americanisation”.

Since the start of Trump’s second term, Russia–US relations have eased somewhat. Yet the United States has continued to maintain sweeping financial sanctions against Russia and has imposed additional sanctions. Anti-Russia forces within the United States remain powerful, and the normalisation of Russia’s relations with the United States remains a distant prospect. Russia is expected to continue advancing its process of “de-Americanisation”, not only in finance but also in areas such as technology and services.

For China, reducing dependence on the United States is also imperative. The United States has defined China as its greatest strategic competitor and greatest threat. It has launched trade and technology wars against China and has spared no effort in continuing to contain and suppress China’s development. China has been forced to pursue self-reliance [自力更生], lessen its dependence on the United States and reduce US-related risks.

European countries are major allies of the United States, but since the start of Trump’s second term, Europe has begun to recognise its dependence on the United States as a major source of risk. “De-risking” from the United States has begun to emerge as a mainstream consensus in Europe. On security, Europe is advancing the development of its military capabilities. On technology, it has begun to exclude US products. On finance, it is accelerating work on the digital euro. On trade, it is moving faster to conclude trade agreements with other economies.

[Note: On technology, the author may be referring to European digital-sovereignty measures in cloud computing. In April 2026, the EU awarded a procurement contract using sovereignty criteria that favoured European providers. Separately, draft EU cloud rules reported in June 2026 may exclude Amazon, Microsoft and Google from some highly critical state tenders.]

The simultaneous efforts by China, Europe and Russia to reduce dependence on and “de-risk” from the United States are unprecedented.

II. Europe and Russia’s Positions Reverse

During the Biden administration, the United States, Europe and Russia were in a de facto state of severed relations. Europe was in a relatively favourable position because it could count on US support. Backed by the United States, Europe contained and confronted Russia, pushing all out for “decoupling from Russia” and “de-Russification” [去俄]. At the same time, it coordinated and cooperated with the United States to advance “de-risking” from China. Russia, by contrast, faced sanctions from the United States, Europe and the West as a whole. Meanwhile, China–Russia relations also faced greater scrutiny and pressure from the United States and Europe, leaving Russia relatively isolated.

However, since the start of Trump’s second term, Europe and Russia’s relative positions have begun to reverse. Europe’s position has continued to deteriorate, while Russia’s has improved markedly.

In Europe’s case, its relations with both the United States and Russia are at historic lows, while its relations with China have become more complex, with uncertainty and disagreements becoming increasingly pronounced.

The simultaneous deterioration of Europe’s relations with both the United States and Russia has deepened its strategic predicament. On the one hand, the loss of US support and the prospect of having to face Russia alone have made it harder for Europe to contain Russia. This may, in future, force Europe to rethink its Russia policy, including by easing and improving relations with Russia, or at least restoring some degree of dialogue. On the other hand, hostile relations with Russia make the dysfunction and breakdown of the transatlantic alliance more painful for Europe, because this is when Europe is at its most vulnerable and most in need of the United States. Yet this also forces Europe to face up to the reality of changes in Europe–US relations and makes adjusting its policy towards the United States more necessary and more urgent.

Over the past few years, Europe has intensified its efforts to “decouple from Russia” and “de-risk” from China. Now, however, it must also confront challenges and threats posed by the United States. In other words, whether by choice or under pressure, Europe is simultaneously pursuing policies that treat China, the United States and Russia alike as adversaries.

Russia’s position, by contrast, has markedly improved. First, Russia–US relations have improved, which is the most important improvement in Russia’s position. The fundamental reason is that the United States no longer regards Russia as a direct security threat and, in particular, is increasingly viewing the Russia–Ukraine conflict from Russia’s standpoint. Second, joint pressure from the United States and Europe has eased. Third, Europe finds it difficult to bring its full strength to bear against Russia. On the one hand, Europe’s own economic and fiscal situation has deteriorated. On the other, the economic, political and security challenges posed to Europe by the United States have continued to grow, forcing Europe to devote more energy to dealing with the United States. As a result, although Europe remains tough on Russia rhetorically, its actual pressure on Russia can no longer keep pace with its rhetoric.

III. China’s Room for Manoeuvre Expands

Compared with Trump’s first term and the Biden administration, China’s position in the four-way interaction among China, the United States, Europe and Russia has markedly improved. China’s relations with each of the other three are all on a relatively normal footing and, for different reasons, all three need to strengthen communication, and even cooperation, with China.

First, the intensity of confrontation in China–US relations has declined somewhat. The United States’ positioning of China and its policy instruments towards China have undergone subtle changes. China–US relations have moved from intense rivalry towards greater stability, while the strategic stand-off has taken on new characteristics and new tendencies. The new framing of a “constructive relationship of strategic stability” [建设性战略稳定关系] has brought a degree of certainty to the development of bilateral relations.

Second, US–Europe coordination on China has declined. Although Europe still believes that coordinating China policy serves the interests of both the United States and Europe, the United States has begun to view Europe as “a power drain rather than a force multiplier”, [with some arguing] “dreams of a fully united American and European front toward China are over.”

[Note: Both quotes are from Zack Cooper’s December 2025 Brookings essay, “How should the United States cooperate with Europe on China strategy?” Cooper argues that US–Europe coordination on China is likely to become more issue-specific, episodic and guarded.]

Third, the role of the United States in China–Europe relations has changed somewhat. The United States remains the most important third-party factor obstructing, and even undermining, China–Europe relations. At the same time, however, it has also become an important factor promoting China–Europe cooperation.

Fourth, the US and European influence on China–Russia relations have weakened somewhat. On the one hand, Europe’s attention has shifted more towards securing US support. On the other, as Europe increasingly recognises the reality of Ukraine’s situation and the need for a ceasefire and an end to the war, it has also begun to see China’s role somewhat differently.

IV. Hegemony, Multipolarity and “De-blocisation”

In an era of major-power competition, interactions among China, the United States, Europe and Russia as the world’s four principal forces will inevitably have major geopolitical implications.

First, hegemonic ideology will face growing constraints. China, Europe and Russia are each advancing “de-risking” from the United States. There is no effective coordination or cooperation among them, but on some issues this has objectively produced the policy effect of a collective China–Europe–Russia response to the United States. In finance, for example, Europe’s promotion of euro internationalisation and the digital euro helps ease the pressure the renminbi faces from the US dollar, and also benefits renminbi internationalisation. Russia’s promotion of local-currency settlement in trade and the diversification of foreign exchange reserves likewise benefits renminbi internationalisation. Conversely, renminbi internationalisation also helps diversify settlement in China–Europe and China–Russia trade, and helps Europe and Russia diversify their foreign exchange reserves. In other words, it helps Europe and Russia “de-risk” from the United States and, in the process, constrain the dollar’s “exorbitant hegemony”.

Second, the trend towards world multipolarity will accelerate. Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy will greatly promote its emergence as an independent pole of power, rather than an appendage of the United States. Europe’s growing independence means that China, the United States, Europe and Russia can, to a greater extent, form a genuine four-way interaction, thereby further advancing “de-blocisation” [去阵营化]. The “de-blocisation” and “de-ideologisation” [去意识形态化] of China–US–Europe–Russia relations will facilitate not only relations among the four parties, but also the normalisation of relations among countries around the world, and will further reduce the pressure on small and medium-sized countries to choose sides.

The United States will naturally not be content to be merely one pole among the world’s many forces, and will do its utmost to maintain its hegemonic position. At the same time, however, it may already have recognised that the advent of the multipolar era is inevitable. If the United States comes to recognise that hegemonism and unilateralism are doing growing harm to itself and proving counterproductive, it may ultimately acknowledge that it can no longer act as a superpower. At present, the United States has already begun to avoid making commitments to allies, engaging in so-called strategic retrenchment. The changes taking place in the United States are the result of its growing internal problems, but are also connected to resistance and opposition to hegemony around the world, especially from China, Europe and Russia.

V. Global Governance: New Opportunities

In sum, Europe’s greater independence and autonomy, together with the United States’ deeper “de-superpowering” [去超级], will continue to advance world multipolarity.

Third, China–Europe cooperation on global governance holds latent new opportunities. Major-power relations have a profound impact on global governance. China, the United States, Europe and Russia are the world’s four principal forces, and the state of their interactions is crucial to global governance. At present, global governance is facing its darkest hour, but it may also be facing some new opportunities.

First, the principle of sovereign equality has been widely reinforced. Europe has begun to taste the bitter fruit of having its sovereignty wantonly violated by the United States. On sovereignty, it has shifted from being a perpetrator in the past to being, to some extent, a victim, and is therefore more sensitive to sovereignty issues than before and has a clearer understanding of them.

Second, the importance of international law has become increasingly prominent. Europe has long held fairly serious double standards on questions of international law. Yet as US actions that disregard international law increasingly cause direct harm to European interests—for example, the US–Israel–Iran war has exacerbated Europe’s economic, financial, energy and security predicaments—European opposition to, and even hostility towards, the United States is also rising.

Third, the necessity of to practising multilateralism is also growing. The damage the United States has done to global rules and global governance has led Europe to recognise that Europe alone, even with its club of “like-minded” partners, is not enough to uphold a multilateral world order. Europe therefore needs to broaden the scope of its cooperation.

During the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Tianjin Summit in September 2025, Chairman Xi Jinping formally put forward the Global Governance Initiative. Its core spirit and principles accord with the common aspirations of peoples around the world and meet the urgent needs of today’s world, including Europe. They provide guidance on the direction for China–Europe cooperation on global governance. As long as Europe casts aside ideological prejudice and fundamentally overcomes its “sense of civilisational superiority”, China and Europe can strengthen cooperation, promote positive interactions among China, the United States, Europe and Russia, advance fairness and justice in the world and promote the democratisation of international relations.

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