Yan Xuetong: Trump's Imperial Turn and the End of the West

"The result is that the United States will no longer be a Western democratic country in the traditional sense, but will gradually evolve into a semi-dictatorial state."

Yan Xuetong tends to dismiss the ideological tropes favoured by some Chinese IR scholars—such as the “the East is rising, the West is declining” or a shift towards multipolarity (rather than US-China bipolarity)—as fantasies. Even so, he argues that beliefs about ideology and legitimacy still matter, because they shape trust, deterrence, and a state’s “strategic credibility”.

This emphasis frames Yan’s assessment of the implications for “the West” of Trump’s newly revamped version of the Monroe Doctrine. Reflecting on what he regards as an “imperialist” and “semi-dictatorial” turn in the American polity, he concludes that the collective identity of the West is in steep decline and potentially heading for a fall—particularly if Trump follows through on his stated ambition to conquer Greenland. Attacking the territory of an allied state would dismantle the conceptual foundation of the Western alliance: the “democratic peace theory”, according to which democratic states do not attack one another.

That Yan takes seriously the role of norms in maintaining the coherence of the West sets him apart from other Chinese scholars, many of whom see the bloc as established more upon racial or civilisational lines than shared institutional beliefs. In his view, shattering the West’s “fantasy” of collective democratic identity would be essentially irreversible: US public opinion would then no longer be able to believe in their country’s identity as a pillar of the rules-based order, shaping future US foreign policy well after Trump.

— James Farquharson

Key Points

1. Domestically, the US is transitioning from a traditional democracy towards a semi-dictatorial state, evidenced by the routine bypassing of Congressional approval for military operations.

2. Internationally, the US is shifting from a republic to an empire, abandoning the liberal international order in favour of 19th-century colonial policies.

3. This imperial turn will dismantle American self-identity as a pillar of the rules-based order, possibly embedding the destruction of international norms into long-term US foreign policy.

4. European countries now confront the reality that US military interventionism is no longer confined to the Global South but potentially targets the West itself.

5. The survival of “Western democracies” as a political concept relies entirely on the continued adherence to the “democratic peace theory” (whereby democracies are at peace with one another) among member states.

6. Military coercion against Greenland would therefore shatter the illusion of the West’s collective identity as democratic states.

7. By leveraging the fear of intervention, Washington intends to convert Latin America into a “tributary system” that mandates decoupling from China and Russia.

8. Future interventions in the Western Hemisphere will likely target vulnerable small nations rather than stable regimes with established counter-intelligence capabilities like Cuba.

   The Scholar

   

   Name: Yan Xuetong (阎学通)
   Date of birth: 7 December 1952 (age: 73)
   Position: Dean of the Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University.
   Previously: Researcher at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) from 1982-1984 and 1992-2000.
   Research focus: International relations
   Education: BA Heilongjiang University (1982); MA University of International Relations (1986); PhD University of California, Berkeley (1992)
   For a more detailed overview of Yan’s career, interests, and publications, see here.

IF TRUMP USES FORCE AGAINST GREENLAND, THE CONCEPT OF “THE WEST” WILL COME CRASHING DOWN
Yan Xuetong (阎学通)
Published by Phoenix Media on 14 January 2025
Lightly edited machine translation
(Illustration by OpenAI’s DALL·E 3)

I. The US Agenda

Interviewer: What risks and benefits for the US are entailed by the military operation against Maduro?

Yan Xuetong: Firstly, this operation was a military intervention into another country’s internal affairs, meticulously planned by the Trump administration. During the preparation phase, they even conducted realistic simulations of the Venezuelan presidential residence; thus, it was not a case of being “forced into a corner” [“迫不得已”] as rumoured by the outside world.

Secondly, regarding this “special military operation”, whilst there were indeed disagreements within US politics, the focus of the divergence was not on the pros and cons of the operation for the US. Rather, the debate centred on whether Trump’s conduct was legal. In summary, acting as the Head of State, Trump bypassed Congress to exercise war powers, disregarding principles stipulated by both domestic and international law. By merely relying on the rhetorical framing to present the action against Venezuela as a “law enforcement operation”, he circumvented the Congressional approval process.

As for the benefits and drawbacks this operation brings to the US, a comprehensive analysis reveals three main points:

Firstly, this special military operation against Venezuela was not formulated or implemented based on US national interests. Instead, it is a politicised manifestation of Trump’s “egocentric” [“自我中心”] style of conduct. The objective is to use military means to create a state of fear under US hegemony within Latin America, thereby consolidating the US hegemonic position in the region.

Secondly, in light of the National Security Strategy report released by the US in 2025, [one can see that] the aim of this action against Venezuela is to establish a US-centred tributary system [朝贡体系] in Latin America. That is to say, within the Latin American region, no major powers other than the United States are permitted to exist.

Thirdly, this operation is consistent with previous US foreign policy. Trump’s intention is that under a US-centric “tributary system”, every sector and resource in Latin America must serve US interests; Venezuela is not the sole target. Simultaneously, Trump will demand that Latin American countries maintain a stance of “decoupling and severing supply chains” [“脱钩断链”] in their relations with other major powers such as China and Russia.

II. Damage to the International Order and the US Transition from a “Republic” to an “Empire”

Interviewer: What will be the domestic political impact of Trump bypassing Congress to authorise the Venezuela operation?

Yan Xuetong: First, at the level of the international order, surgical strikes similar to this one against Venezuela are set to be repeatedly staged against a further number of small and medium-sized nations during Trump’s administration. To date, US overseas strike operations have already spread to seven countries, including Somalia and Yemen. This fully demonstrates that, at present, the United States no longer abides by the most basic principles of national sovereignty stipulated by the United Nations. Simultaneously, the US’s conduct here represents a flagrant destruction of the international order.

Second, as regards US public opinion, the notion that the US is no longer a country that abides by international law, nor one that adheres to the liberal international order that it established post-Cold War, will be circulated en masse among the American people. In short, domestic public opinion will form a consensus: the US is no longer a country that observes the rules-based international order. As a result, it is foreseeable that US destruction of the international order will continue to intensify in the future.

Third, at the level of domestic politics, the United States will see growing debate over a qualitative shift from “Republic to Empire” [“共和走向帝国”]. Such questioning will continue to ferment within US political circles. The result is that the United States will no longer be a Western democratic country in the traditional sense, but will gradually evolve into a semi-dictatorial state [半独裁式的国家].

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Interviewer: Are there deeper structural causes—aside from Trump’s personality—of the shift to an “imperial presidency”?

Yan Xuetong: First, if such a trend truly takes place, it will certainly not be due to social factors within the US. Trump’s current approach is extremely similar to that of 19th-century imperialism. His objective is to alter the status quo of the United States. However, although a complete regression to an imperialist model during his administration is not a certainty, his governing style will continuously move closer to that model. In other words, the occurrence of such a trend is caused on some level by Trump personally aligning his mode of governance with imperialist colonial policies. Furthermore, it is certain that the America of Trump’s tenure will absolutely not be the America as traditionally understood.

Second, one cannot rule out the possibility that future US presidents following Trump will continue this policy trend of quasi-imperialist colonialism. The reason lies in the fact that, so far, the voter base of Trump’s Republican Party within the US political landscape remains larger than that of the Democratic Party, while the prospects of domestic electoral support for the Democrats remain insufficiently bright.

III. Establishing a US-Centred Tributary System in Latin America

Interviewer: What is the probability of the US military action in Venezuela being followed up by a similar move in Cuba?

Yan Xuetong: Firstly, the next target of the US is difficult to predict. The only certainty is that during Trump’s term, further occurrences of such interventionist behaviour destructive to the international order will become even more likely, rather than less. Secondly, if the US is preparing to initiate its next strike, then Cuba is one of the targets. However, the likelihood of other small and medium-sized nations being targeted is higher. The reasons are as follows:

1. Cuba is an exemplar of a Latin American nation that opposes US hegemony, and as such the US intelligence advantage in Cuba is lower than it would be in other Latin American countries.

2. Compared with Venezuela, Cuba possesses higher regime stability and experience in counter-intelligence work. One of the significant reasons for the success of the operation against Venezuela lay in accurate intelligence. Thus, comparatively speaking, the US’s difficulty in infiltrating Venezuela was much lower than it would be for Cuba.

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Interviewer: Should Trump’s assertion of a plan to “run” Venezuela be interpreted as genuine?

Yan Xuetong: Firstly, up to this point, the person serving as President of Venezuela is the Vice President from the Maduro era (Delcy Rodríguez), not someone supported by the US. The current political situation in Venezuela is neither a puppet regime obeying US orders nor a leaderless state falling into anarchy. Therefore, the announcement by the US that they would “run” the country is still far from reality.

Secondly, the suggestions by public opinion that Rubio serve as the “Viceroy” of Venezuela, or similar claims, are essentially a satirical way of viewing US foreign behaviour as imperialist conduct. Objectively speaking, the US has not yet made further substantive moves to take over Venezuela, so the notion of running Venezuela is not yet a reality.

IV. The “New-Era Monroe Doctrine” vs. the “Donroe Doctrine”

Interviewer: Trump’s embrace of Monroe Doctrine rhetoric has spawned neologisms such as the Donroe Doctrine [唐罗主义] and Dong-roe Doctrine [懂罗主义, i.e. “know-it-all doctrine”]. What are your insights regarding the difference between the Monroe Doctrine and the Donroe Doctrine?

Yan Xuetong: Rather than a Donroe Doctrine, [Trump’s worldview] is more akin to a “New-Era Monroe Doctrine”. There are connections between the two, but also distinctions. The distinctions are as follows:

1. The early Monroe Doctrine referred merely to the Americas, not the entire Western Hemisphere as understood today. Trump’s actions clearly transcend the bounds of the traditional Monroe Doctrine, as he is still interfering in affairs outside the Americas.

2. The Monroe Doctrine emphasised that the US would not intervene in disputes between other (European) nations. This stands in stark contrast to Trump’s behaviour today, as the US continues to intervene in European affairs. The National Security Strategy report released by the US in 2025 conveys a very clear intent: the US aims to occupy and dominate all affairs in the Latin American region. Although this point aligns with the essence of the Monroe Doctrine, US conduct overseas has long since leapt beyond the geopolitical scope of Latin America, using hegemonic conduct to forcibly proscribe regional orders dominated by major powers in other parts of the world.

3. The Monroe Doctrine referred primarily to not allowing European powers to encroach militarily upon Latin America; it did not exclude economic exchanges between Latin America and other global regions. Trump, however, wants to ban economic cooperation between Latin American countries and other major regional powers.

V. European Anxiety Over the Survival of the Concept of the “West”

Interviewer: What shock will the trend of adopting interventionist actions beyond Latin America deliver to the collective security mechanisms of the international order?

Yan Xuetong: There is a significant difference in how European countries and non-European countries perceive the Trump administration and its foreign policy.

First, countries outside of Europe are generally concerned about whether US power politics and hegemonic actions will spread to other regions, thereby rattling and triggering a historic regression of the existing international order, and intensifying uncertainty over national security.

Second, European countries are mostly concerned about whether this form of US power politics and hegemonic behaviour will spread to Europe. To some degree, European states—for example, Italy—maintain an attitude of approval, based on a realist assessment, of the overseas hegemonic policies implemented by the Trump administration in regions external to Europe.

The issue they are more concerned about is whether US hegemonic behaviour will also be applied to European states themselves, including the use of force against them—for instance, over the question of Greenland’s sovereignty. The core of this is whether the concept of the “West”, which European nations have long believed in, can endure. Grounded in values such as the democratic peace theory, European countries share a consensus that they are all democratic members of Western society. Therefore, were Trump to resort to force over Greenland, this fantasy of [a community of] so-called “democratic countries” within Western society would be shattered, thereby dealing a [profound] psychological blow to European states. This is also the main worry that has emerged among European countries in the wake of the US operation [in Venezuela].

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Interviewer: What is the likelihood of the Trump administration using military means to obtain Greenland?

Yan Xuetong: It is difficult to determine whether the US will truly use military means to occupy Greenland. What is certain, however, is that during Trump’s term he will undoubtedly take measures on multiple fronts to achieve his objectives regarding Greenland. Responses from the White House have indicated that the Trump administration will not rule out the possibility of using force to exert pressure over Greenland.

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