Shao Yuqun on the Post-Summit Shift in Trump’s Taiwan Policy

"If war breaks out across the Strait because the Taiwan authorities push for 'Taiwan independence', the US will not send troops to intervene..."

I happened to be in Washington, D.C. at the time of Trump’s 13–15 May state visit to Beijing, and felt the concern among Democrats and establishment Republicans that Trump might throw Taiwan under the bus during his trip—either in private remarks to Xi Jinping or in a public statement.

Trump was quiet on Taiwan while in Beijing and there were probably sighs of relief on Capitol Hill as he boarded Air Force One. Yet moments later, Trump told reporters on board that he and Xi had discussed arms sales to Taiwan. Shao Yuqun (邵育群) in our translation below, reads this admission as a break with the Six Assurances that the US privately extended to Taiwan in connection with the August 1982 communiqué—specifically, the assurance that Washington would not hold prior consultations with Beijing over arms sales to Taiwan.

In his Air Force One comments, Trump also added that “the last thing we need right now is a war that’s 9,500 miles away”. He struck the same note in a Fox News interview with Bret Baier, telling him, “we are not looking to have somebody say, ‘Let’s go independent because the United States is backing us’”. Trump insisted that long-standing US policy remained unchanged. Shao, however, draws the opposite conclusion, interpreting his stance on Taiwan’s independence as a “clear policy shift”.

Trump’s post-summit remarks are all the more significant because the Chinese side has sought to bind the tentative US–China détente and the new “stability” framing firmly to Taiwan. This is the position adopted by commentators covered in our post-summit brief and also the official position, with Xi himself stating that if the Taiwan question is “handled properly” the relationship will be stable, and if not, the two countries “will have clashes and even conflicts” (碰撞甚至冲突).

Most Chinese commentators read Trump’s post-summit remarks as broadly favourable to Beijing, but they are split over whether they mark a genuine shift in US policy. The more cautious camp includes commentators like US returnee scholar Cheng Li (李成), who read continuity and argue that the US will not move from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity.

The other camp, to which Shao Yuqun clearly belongs, reads a genuine shift. Alongside her, the nationalist commentator Jin Canrong (金灿荣) argues that Trump’s 9,500-miles rhetoric is a near-explicit signal that Washington will not intervene should “Taiwan independence” provoke war. Shao makes much the same argument: she reads Trump as explicitly refusing to back “Taiwan independence”, and although she frames this as “a compromise Washington had no choice but to make”, she lands on the same conclusion—that “if war breaks out across the Strait because the Taiwan authorities push for ‘Taiwan independence’, the United States will not send troops to intervene.”

Theirs is a contested reading, but Chinese scholars’ readiness to conclude that the United States would not intervene if Taiwan declared independence can only have deepened the concern already evident in Washington as Trump’s visit began.

—Jacob Mardell

Key Points

1. Although the new framing of a relationship of “constructive strategic stability” faces substantial opposition within the US, the consensus is historically significant.

2. Beijing has challenged Washington’s strategic narrative by advancing one of its own, demonstrating that, as China’s overall strength grows, so too does its capacity to shape the course of China–US relations.

3. Trump’s unwillingness to back “Taiwan independence” is a compromise Washington had no choice but to make after the balance of economic pressure points forced the US to recognise the limits of its own power.

4. Trump has now stated publicly that he discussed arms sales to Taiwan with the Chinese leader, showing that he has, in effect, abandoned the “Six Assurances” the U.S. made to Taiwan in 1982.

5. Trump has made it clear that he will not back “Taiwan independence”, marking a clear policy shift—if Taiwan authorities push for “Taiwan independence”, the United States will not send troops to intervene.

6. However, the Washington establishment opposes Trump’s posture on Taiwan and will be seeking an opportunity to reassert its agenda: Taiwan remains the issue most likely to upset relations between the US and China.

The Scholar

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Name: Shao Yuqun (邵育群)
Born: 1975 (age: 50/51)
Position: Director, Institute for Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS); Senior Research Fellow, Center for American Studies, SIIS
Previously: Deputy Director, Department of American Studies, SIIS; Director, Department of Research Management & International Exchange, SIIS; Deputy Director, South Asia Research Center, SIIS
Research focus: US foreign policy; US global strategy; China-US relations; US policy towards the Asia-Pacific; Taiwan and cross-Strait relations
Education: BA (Chinese Language and Literature), East China Normal University; MA (International Chinese Studies), East China Normal University; PhD (International Relations), Fudan University (2003)

US TAIWAN STRAIT POLICY UNDER THE NEW FRAMING OF CHINA-US RELATIONS
Shao Yuqun (邵育群)
Published by Shanghai Institutes for International Studies on June 5th
Based on seminar held 28 May
(Lightly edited machine translation)

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During President Trump’s visit to China, the two leaders reached a consensus and committed to building a relationship of “constructive strategic stability” [建设性战略稳定关系]. China explicitly defined this as positive stability with cooperation as the mainstay, healthy stability with competition within proper limits, constant stability with manageable differences, and lasting stability with expectable peace.The US, however, added the words “on the basis of fairness and reciprocity” to the formulation. This shows that, although the two sides agree on a new framing for China–US relations, they differ over what it entails.

Throughout the history of China–US relations, there have been many instances in which the two sides have sought common ground while shelving their differences in the hope of restarting, stabilising or advancing bilateral relations. This time is no exception. There will likely be considerable disagreement and strategic manoeuvring over how to implement the consensus reached at the leaders’ meeting, and the new framing also faces substantial opposition within the US bureaucracy and strategic studies community. Even so, it is of historic significance.

First, after the US began pursuing a strategy of great-power competition with China, Beijing challenged Washington’s strategic narrative by advancing one of its own, grounded in the two sides’ lowest common denominator: “strategic stability”. This shows that, as China’s overall strength continues to grow, so too does its capacity to shape both the current state and future course of China–US relations.

Second, China has expanded what “strategic stability” encompasses. The US conception of the term emerged from the experience of US–Soviet superpower rivalry during the Cold War. Before the two presidents met in Busan last year, Washington repeatedly stressed that it hoped to achieve strategic stability with China—meaning that it wanted China to participate in US–Russia nuclear talks. This time, by bringing artificial intelligence (AI) safety and other issues bearing on world peace and development within the framework of “strategic stability”, Beijing has made a deft move to counter Washington’s Cold War thinking and make clear that it does not want to start a second Cold War.

Third, both sides have made clear that the future of China–US relations lies in peaceful coexistence rather than conflict. Although the Biden administration also stressed the need for “guardrails” in the relationship and said that the United States did not want a military conflict with China, it was never willing to state clearly what the “end state” of China–US strategic competition would be. This time, the US made no mention of “strategic competition”, and Trump explicitly stated that he would not back “Taiwan independence”. In essence, this was a compromise Washington had no choice but to make after the two sides’ recent targeting of each other’s economic chokepoints [互卡脖子] produced “economic mutual assured disruption” and led the US to recognise the limits of its own power.

President Trump’s remarks on Taiwan following his departure from Beijing point to a significant shift in his administration’s policy. First, Trump has, in effect, abandoned the “Six Assurances”. He said that 1982 was a long time ago and that an agreement reached then should not prevent him from discussing arms sales to Taiwan with the Chinese leader. During Trump’s first term, Washington treated the “Six Assurances” privately conveyed to Taiwan by President Reagan as one of the three foundations of official US “one China” policy, alongside the Taiwan Relations Act and the three US–China joint communiqués. Trump has now stated publicly that he discussed arms sales to Taiwan with the Chinese leader, and that the discussion went into considerable detail. This shows that he has, in effect, abandoned the “Six Assurances”.

Second, President Trump has made clear that he will not back “Taiwan independence”. Trump stated explicitly: “We are not looking to have somebody say, ‘Let’s go independent because the United States is backing us.’” This is a major blow to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities in Taiwan and to the “deep-green” [深绿] forces within the party. The US establishment opposed Chen Shui-bian’s pursuit of “de jure Taiwan independence” [法理台独], but welcomed Tsai Ing-wen’s “incremental Taiwan independence” [渐进台独]. It regards Lai Ching-te’s policies as provocative towards the mainland and as complicating Washington’s efforts to manage the situation. Yet because the United States is engaged in strategic competition with China, it remains unwilling to criticise Lai publicly. Trump, by contrast, has focused on economics and semiconductors, stating bluntly that he is unwilling to risk war with mainland China in order to back “Taiwan independence”. This marks a clear policy shift.

Third, President Trump has introduced a measure of clarity into the policy of “strategic ambiguity”. Trump said that China’s leader asked him directly whether the United States would intervene if conflict broke out in the Taiwan Strait. He replied: “I don’t want to talk about that.” This is consistent with the position Trump has maintained since taking office: he is unwilling to state whether the United States would intervene in a cross-Strait conflict, which is precisely the traditional US policy of “strategic ambiguity”. Yet given that Trump has also said he is unwilling to back “Taiwan independence”, he has in effect introduced a measure of clarity into the policy: namely, that if war breaks out across the Strait because the Taiwan authorities push for “Taiwan independence”, the United States will not send troops to intervene.

President Trump’s words matter, but the actual policies that follow will matter more, especially US arms-sales policy towards Taiwan. There are powerful forces within the United States opposed to Trump’s postponement of the latest arms sale to Taiwan, and they are waiting for their moment. The strategic contest between China and the United States over Taiwan will continue. Taiwan is also the issue most likely to rupture a relationship of constructive strategic stability between China and the United States.

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