November Digest | Part 2 — International Relations

US-China | Europe | Japan | Africa | Russia

Today’s post concludes our round-up of noteworthy analyses and commentaries from November. Part 1 is available here.

1. US-China:

   1. Huang Jing on what would be traded in a theoretical Sino-US “Grand Bargain”.

   2. Ronnie Chan on the end of global capital expansion and China’s resilience in a world of systemic tightening.

   3. Jin Canrong on the motivations for US intervention in Venezuela and the (non-)implications for its Indo-Pacific strategy.

2. Europe:

   1. Wang Wanying, Li Zhengdong & Ma Xiaolin on the threat posed by the EU’s enlargement policy to China’s Central and Eastern Europe strategy.

   2. Li Xing on European reliance on US security structures and the politically useful myth of strategic autonomy.

   3. Wang Wanying & Ma Xiaolin on the EU’s shift from rights-based idealism to camp-based alignment with the US in its new digital policy.

   4. Ding Chun: (i) on the continued attraction of China’s market and industrial ecosystem for European industrialists; and (ii) on why EU disengagement with China on trade could deepen its innovation crisis.

   5. Gao Jian on what international human rights research says about the “weaponisation” of UK China scholarship.

3. Japan:

   1. Cao Xin on China’s invocation of the UN Charter’s “enemy state clauses” and Japan’s contestation of them.

   2. Lian Degui on Beijing’s tougher Taiwan stance, pressure on Japan’s right wing and targeted non-inflammatory countermeasures.

   3. Wu Xinbo on how wide-ranging diplomatic coalition building could be China’s route to isolating Japan.

   4. Zheng Yongnian on Japan’s “semi-sovereignty” and its pursuit of sovereign normalisation through military build-up.

4. Africa:

   1. Liu Qiang on maintaining China’s commitment to non-interference amid systemic risk to its investment projects in Africa.

   2. Wang Jinjie on leveraging AI to carry out “cross-cultural leadership” in Africa, rather than relying purely on capital inputs.

5. Russia:

   1. Wang Yongzhong on using central bank digital currencies to improve connectivity in Sino-Russian trade (and, potentially, throughout Asia).

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1. US-China Relations

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Huang Jing (黄靖): With Busan signifying a gradual reversal of relative power and credibility in the Sino-US relationship, three theoretical pillars for a Sino-US “Grand Bargain” are coming into view. 1) Financially, the US requires a stable absorber of US Treasuries, while China needs to expand RMB global convertibility — potentially allowing the construction of a new system where the RMB plays a secondary international settlement role within a dollar-anchored system. 2) Militarily, the unavoidable (but only partial) retrenchment of US forces in the Indo-Pacific creates incentives to redefine a modus operandi for military coexistence — gradually disengaging from Taiwan without total withdrawal from the region. 3) Normatively, a durable equilibrium depends on establishing rules and red lines, especially a bilateral “no-go list” (不做清单) to establish long-term strategic reassurance. — Director, Institute for American and Pacific Studies, Shanghai International Studies University (观察者网, 4 November)

Ronnie Chan (陈启宗): As the era of capital expansion shifts into one of systemic tightening where the imperative is to “preserve life and capital” (保命保本), China’s resilience — in the form of social cohesion and a strong manufacturing base — becomes a decisive advantage. As global fragmentation and US isolation intensify, China’s commitment to the real economy and the strength of its social values stand it in better stead than over-financialised Western economies. To preserve these strengths, Chinese youth should cleave to “rational patriotism” and avoid over-idealising Western ideals of freedom (which have led to disorder and social dysfunction). Studying abroad in the US can inculcate the latter and should be avoided. — Chairman, Hang Lung Group, Shanghai Development Research Foundation (上海发展研究基金会, 4 November)

Jin Canrong (金灿荣): Although the escalation of US military activity near Venezuela signals a renewed defence emphasis on Western Hemisphere control, it does not indicate strategic retrenchment from the Western Pacific — where Washington intends to sustain competition with China. Venezuela’s status as a regional “troublemaker” (刺头) and its oil reserves underpin US pressure, yet regime change remains uncertain given high anti-American sentiment and the risks of invasion. Beijing will offer only political backing, while Russia — though Venezuelan military systems are based on Russian models and therefore compatible with their equipment — lacks spare capacity for military aid due to the Ukraine war. The strongest deterrent available to Maduro lies in consolidating domestic stability and military cohesion. — Professor, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (金金乐道编辑部, 6 November)

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2. Europe

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Wang Wanying (王婉赢), Li Zhengdong (李正东) & Ma Xiaolin (马晓霖): The EU’s latest enlargement report signals a shift to reinforcing the EU’s shaping of its periphery, complicating China’s engagement in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). By ranking accession candidates through a tiered “loyalty” system [Note: in the authors’ description], the new framework turns “multi-speed Europe” into a political reality and risks fragmenting China’s previous “17+1” cooperation platform with CEE countries. At the same time, a “Ukraine model” that combines fiscal integration with a non-militarised “economic security shield” (经济安全罩) is emerging as a potentially exportable economic instrument that could rival the Belt and Road Initiative for influence in other regions. — Research Fellows, China-CEEC Trade and Economic Cooperation Institute, Ningbo University; Director, Institute of Mediterranean Studies, Zhejiang International Studies University (凤凰网国际智库, 10 November)

Li Xing (李形): Rather than aiming for true autonomy, the concept of European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) strengthens Europe’s capacity to operate within the US-led transatlantic system, with EU treaty provisions embedding defence policy inside NATO rather than creating a genuinely independent security order. Strategically, ESA seeks to raise Europe’s bargaining power by turning US demands for burden-sharing into shared decision-making within the alliance, functioning as a form of “self-insurance” (自我保险) amid geopolitical flux. Yet Europe’s alignment with US technology controls—seen in the Nexperia case—and its structural reliance on American nuclear, intelligence and command systems ensure ESA remains little more than a politically useful “myth” (神话), projecting an image of reduced dependence on the US to both domestic publics and international rivals. — Director, Centre for European Studies, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies (中国日报, 16 November)

Wang Wanying (王婉赢) & Ma Xiaolin (马晓霖): The EU’s Digital Omnibus Act signals a turn from rights-centred idealism to a camp-aligned approach that eases data governance both internally and with the US, while empowering regulators to subjectively exclude Chinese firms. This shift stems from Europe’s recognition that stringent regulation has constrained its competitiveness amid the monopoly of US tech giants and China’s rapid digital ascent, with the regulation setting up a “digital iron curtain” (数字铁幕) without carrying out overt decoupling. However, the two-year window before full implementation in 2027 gives China space for legal contestation, while also offering an opportunity to diversify and develop a Global South–anchored “digital second pole”. — Research Fellow, China-CEEC Trade and Economic Cooperation Institute, Ningbo University; Professor and Director, Institute of Mediterranean Studies, Zhejiang International Studies University (凤凰网国际智库, 26 November)

Ding Chun (丁纯): While seeking to insulate China risk from their wider supply chains, European firms are maintaining China operations due to the draw of the Chinese market and the efficiency of its intensely competitive industrial ecosystem. Cheaper energy inputs and cost-effective components make China indispensable for certain European automobile and chemical conglomerates, which continue to reinvest profits in China, explaining the softer stance of a portion of member states on trade. Although structural tensions will probably only permit a “second-best compromise” (次优解) in EU-China relations, economic pragmatism and internal disunity mean that Europe’s approach to China will not entirely follow that of the US, only aligning in areas of direct self-interest (such as rare earths). — Director, Centre for European Studies, Fudan University (观察者网, 3 November)

Ding Chun (丁纯): The EU’s innovation crisis and the institutional rigidity that has stalled reform implementation will only be deepened by trade policies towards China that risk severing access to its technologies and markets. Europe’s emergence as an “innovation lowland” (创新洼地) is reflected in the slow diffusion of US and Chinese patents (typically 18 months), matched only by the sometimes even slower application of its own technological breakthroughs. Beyond the well-recognised proposals of the Draghi Report, Europe must integrate itself into global two-way technology flows — including constructive cooperation with China in green and digital technologies — to shorten its innovation catch-up cycle and prevent further erosion of its competitiveness. — Director, Centre for European Studies, Fudan University (环球时报, 24 November)

Gao Jian (高健): The controversy over Sheffield Hallam University’s suspension of Laura Murphy’s project on China’s policy toward the Uyghur minority, rather than an instance of academic repression, should be considered an opportunity for the UK to “reflect on the weaponisation of scholarship” (反思学术“武器化”). This tendency has resulted from a UK turn toward “securitisation of academia” (学术安全化) after China was labelled a “systemic challenge” in 2023, aligning research with geopolitical agendas and “transatlantic anti-China networks” (跨大西洋反华网络). Through mobilising capital and discourse to impose ideological filters on China research, these have constrained genuine academic freedom. — Director, Centre for Research on Sino-British Exchange, Shanghai International Studies University (环球时报, 6 November)

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3. Japan

N.B. The following includes several noteworthy articles that were not featured in our recent China–Japan relations Briefing.

Cao Xin (曹辛): The invocation of the UN Charter’s “enemy state clauses” by China’s embassy in Japan is a powerful statement of the legitimacy of China’s position under international law. The clauses authorise military action against former WWII enemy states without Security Council approval upon the re-appearance of an “invasion policy”, and though the UN General Assembly has voted in favour of abolishing the clauses, they have not been revoked by the Security Council. Since the current diplomatic impasse can only be broken by a high-level “admission of wrongdoing” (认错) from Japan, China is preparing for a prolonged phase of “politically and economically cold” (政经俱冷) relations, likely escalating next through rare-earths measures and broader economic pressure. — Secretary-General, International Public Opinion Research Centre, Charhar Institute. (FT中文网, 25 November)

Lian Degui (廉德瑰): Sino-Japanese ties are set to remain strained for months, yet Beijing’s pressure on Japan’s right-wing leadership may expose the impracticality of its hardline posture and ultimately open space for more pragmatic politicians. China’s visibly hardening stance on Taiwan, apparent after September’s military parade [九三阅兵], reflects reduced tolerance for provocation thereby elevating calibrated coercion as an essential policy lever. However, measures must remain focused on Takaichi’s camp and pro-Taiwan factions rather than wider society, as excessive pressure risks fuelling Japanese nationalism and undermining the strategic aim of encouraging moderation. — Director, Centre for Japanese Studies, Shanghai International Studies University (观察者网, 24 November)

Wu Xinbo (武心波): The Chinese response to Takaichi’s remark must shift from passive reaction to reshaping the strategic environment, both through expanded diplomatic measures and intensified joint naval exercises with Russia. China can widen its “circle of friends” (朋友圈) by relying on the Belt and Road Initiative to deepen cooperation with ASEAN, Latin America and Africa, thereby weakening Japan’s international discourse power and sapping the moral legitimacy of its policies through external scrutiny. — Research Fellow, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Shanghai International Studies University (东西哲思录, 21 November)

Zheng Yongnian (郑永年): The “copy-pasting” (照抄照搬) of Western ideas such as Social Darwinism and imperialism during the Meiji Restoration left Japan without independent thought or genuine spiritual transformation, setting the foundations for long-term dependence on the United States. This has created a self-destructive trajectory in which an insecure, “semi-sovereign” (半主权) Japan pursues “normalisation” through nationalism, “anti-China” mobilisation and militarisation within a US-forged “golden shackle” (黄金枷锁). As economic decline deepens, the diversion of scarce resources into armaments risks replicating the path of other over-militarised powers and renders Japan a potential trigger — alongside states such as the Philippines — for a catastrophic Third World War. — Director, Institute for International Affairs, Chinese University of Hong Kong (Shenzhen) (大湾区评论, 26 November)

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4. Africa

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Liu Qiang (刘强): While Africa is a long-standing strategic priority for China, the continent’s instability poses direct threats to personnel, assets and key supply chains for critical minerals amid rising scrutiny of China’s adherence to non-interference. China’s extensive investment footprint heightens the stakes of regional volatility and underscores the need for effective risk management, including diversifying investment towards more stable states and new sectors. Meanwhile, limited security engagement through UN peacekeeping, bilateral cooperation and regulated Chinese security providers can protect security interests without deep entanglement. — Vice Chairman, Shanghai Centre for RimPac Strategic and International Studies (环太国际战略, 10 November)

Wang Jinjie (王进杰): As Chinese firms push overseas, transmitting values through “cross-cultural leadership” (跨文化领导力) matters more for influence than investment, which can be dismissed as “capital invasion” (资本入侵) when detached from the needs and attitudes of local society. Africa’s youthful demographics and high mobile penetration create vast labour and consumer markets, while rapid AI adoption allows firms to use AI as a cross-cultural “amplifier” (放大器) for enhancing localisation, bridging multilingual barriers and supporting culturally attuned projects that convert demographic and technology dividends into growth opportunities. — Assistant Researcher, NSD & ISSCAD, Peking University (北大国发院, 5 November)

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5. Russia

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Wang Yongzhong (王永中): The solution for bottlenecks in Sino-Russian economic cooperation is deeper integration of border economies and financial infrastructure, particularly the use of the digital RMB and digital rouble to bypass legacy clearing systems. This would emulate existing models such as mBridge and have scope for extension to Central Asian and SCO states through expanded blockchain-based central bank digital currency networks. Other measures to improve trade flow include overseas warehouses, and modernised rail, energy and financial connectivity in the less developed border regions. — Researcher, Institute of World Economics and Politics, CASS (《俄罗斯学刊》, Issue 5)

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SINIFICATION’S NOVEMBER POSTS IN REVIEW

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N.B. Our newsletter features a broad spectrum of voices, ranging from conservative hawks and state propagandists to more moderate and liberal thinkers. Readers are encouraged to bear this diversity in mind when engaging with the content.