There is something distinctly High Victorian about Di Dongsheng’s closing proclamation that “the descendants of the dragon shall ultimately rule the stars and the waves”. Indeed, the piece certainly strikes an extremely hawkish tone throughout, with Di proposing the establishment of a naval–merchant–financial complex to wrest maritime power from the “Anglo Saxons”. Yet Di is also picking up on a familiar thread in Chinese strategic thinking, made newly urgent by events around the Strait of Hormuz: the vulnerability and importance of maritime chokepoints.
The argument is framed, at least, with a defensive fig leaf. Despite the new “relationship of constructive strategic stability between China and the United States”, Di does not believe that Trump has “accepted defeat”, and he expects the US to build leverage against China’s vulnerabilities, chief among which are chokepoints on its vital maritime routes. His solution? China should embark on a thirty-year effort to secure dominance over the high seas.
We included this piece in the August digest, alongside articles by Zhao Long and Hu Bo. These scholars also highlight maritime chokepoints but take the opposite view, emphasising legal and diplomatic solutions to China’s anxieties. Hu argues that China cannot pursue absolute security through military means and that as the world’s largest goods-trading nation, it must “accept a certain degree of risk and vulnerability.”
Di does not quite use the phrase “absolute security”, but he makes the case for something like it—“compromise, retreat and avoidance offer no way forward,” he writes. Unlike Hu, he sees a fundamental mismatch between China’s status as the world’s largest trading nation and that of the United States as the world’s pre-eminent maritime power. His preference for creating a new status quo through independent action echoes China’s already assertive posture in the South China Sea, albeit extending the strategic consideration to more distant waters. His reference points run from Diego Garcia to the Dardanelles.
Di therefore poses his own clear response to the question of whether China is a revisionist power, recently the subject of some debate in Western policy circles: if it isn’t, it should be. “The future of the Chinese nation”, he writes, “does not lie solely in one corner of East Asia… Only by embracing the oceans, conquering the oceans and regaining command of the oceans can the Chinese nation have a future.”
— James Farquharson & Jacob Mardell
Key Points
The era of open seas may be coming to an end, and China must prepare itself for the coming struggle over sea power and the security of maritime routes.
Trump has not accepted defeat, and the Americans may be building up leverage against several of China’s vulnerabilities, chief amongst which are its maritime routes.
China is the world’s largest trading nation, but dominance over the oceans remains in the hands of the United States and its allies
The US will consolidate its ability to control key maritime nodes, creating a form of leverage over China and a perpetual sense of vulnerability.
Likely key sites of future competition for sea power include straits such as Malacca and the Dardanelles, islands such as the Ryukyu Islands and deep-water ports such as Chancay Port in Peru.
Drone technology and satellite remote-sensing technology have both substantially weakened sea power’s advantage over land power.
Compromise, retreat and avoidance offer no way forward—continental transport is no substitute for maritime shipping, while German history demonstrates the necessity of engaging in naval competition.
China is approaching naval parity with the US according to some measures, but once the US alliance network and overseas bases are taken into account, China is far from overtaking the US.
China needs around thirty years to secure control over the seas. Until then, it should expect maritime disruption.
The future of the Chinese nation does not lie solely in one corner of East Asia. Only by regaining command of the oceans can the Chinese nation have a future.
The Author
Name: Di Dongsheng (翟东升)
Year of birth: 1976
Positions: Professor and Associate Dean, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (RUC); Dean, Institute of Regional and Country Studies, RUC
Other: Director, Centre for European Studies, RUC; Executive Dean, Joint Institute for European Studies, Ministry of Education; Distinguished Research Fellow, International Monetary Institute, RUC; Vice Chairman, National Association of Emerging Economy Studies
Research focus: International political economy of money and finance; China’s foreign economic relations; US political economy
Education: BA (1998), MA (2001) and PhD in International Relations (2004), Renmin University of China
Experience Abroad: Visiting Scholar, Sciences Po (2001); Visiting Scholar, Durham University (2003); part-time teaching, Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Boston University Brussels (2005–06); Visiting Scholar, Georgetown University (2015)
SEA POWER COMPETITION AND MARITIME ROUTE SECURITY
By Di Dongsheng (翟东升)
Published on his public account on 25 August
Human-edited machine translation
Recently, I have developed a hypothesis: the era of open seas may be coming to an end, and we must prepare ourselves for the coming struggle over sea power and the security of maritime routes.
I. Sea Power’s Winners and Losers
In the tariff and sanctions wars between China and the United States in 2025, China gained the upper hand. Trump found that he did not have many cards left to play, so he had no choice but to call a halt to the economic war and turn to temporary compromise to buy time. This was what led to Trump’s humble visit to China [谦卑访华] and the resulting relationship of constructive strategic stability between China and the United States [中美建设性战略稳定关系].
The problem is: did Trump really accept defeat? Did the US strategic community accept this? Based on my research, Trump has not accepted defeat, and within the US strategic community, the idea of a “relationship of constructive strategic stability between China and the United States” has not gained mainstream acceptance either. Some believe that the Americans are saving up for a killer move [憋大招], making preparations and waiting for the right moment to target several of China’s vulnerabilities.
One of China’s most obvious vulnerabilities is its maritime routes. As the world’s largest trading nation, around 95% of China’s foreign trade is carried by sea, yet dominance over the oceans remains in the hands of the United States and its allies. One source of this is a historical legacy stretching back 600 years. After the Yongli reign of the Southern Ming, the Chinese nation [华夏民族] voluntarily relinquished its advantage in sea power, thereby handing Europeans the mandate [天命] of the Age of Exploration. Another source is the cost of a contemporary strategic choice. In the 1970s, we chose strategic cooperation with the United States in order to repel Soviet great-power chauvinism and expansionism. A by-product was that the sea power of the Anglo-Saxon peoples once again came to prevail over the Eurasian continent [Note: Echoing the German jurist Carl Schmitt’s opposition between continental and maritime power, itself a relatively common thread in modern Chinese political and legal theory].
Over the past half-century, China’s industrialisation has shifted the centre of global manufacturing and trade from the west coast of the United States to China’s south-eastern seaboard, while the economic relationship between China and the United States has gradually moved from symbiosis towards competition. This has created a problem: the relationship between the power that controls the seas and the power that depends on maritime transport has shifted from one of cooperation to competition. This could very well spell the end of maritime openness.
As early as the COVID-19 pandemic, some US military strategists began discussing the feasibility of issuing “letters of marque” against Chinese merchant vessels, encouraging various maritime armed forces to side with the United States in containing China [Note: a genuine proposal from a retired colonel of the US Marine Corps in Proceedings, the magazine of the US Naval Institute]. Since the second half of 2025, geopolitical shifts have occurred at several key maritime strategic locations: first the Panama Canal, then the Arctic shipping routes and Greenland, followed by the Strait of Hormuz. Together, these constitute a series of warning signs that maritime openness is drawing to a close.
Of course, we do not believe that the United States will, any time soon, entirely prevent Chinese merchant vessels from navigating freely on the high seas. But the Americans will consolidate their ability to control key nodes, thereby creating a form of controllable tension [可管控的紧张], together with the capacity to keep that tension under control. [Note: A purported contemporary US focus on controlling key strategic nodes was described as "hegemony on the cheap" by scholars at the official Chinese think tank CICIR.] It is as if someone is drawing the point of a dagger back and forth across your throat and other sensitive areas, leaving you constantly wary and on-edge.
II. The Key Maritime Routes for Sea Power
Surveying the world’s maritime routes, the following chokepoints are likely to be key sites of future competition for sea power:
The Suez Canal connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. If it were brought under control, maritime routes linking Europe and the Mediterranean with Asia would have to divert around the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. Control of the canal was once at the centre of the Suez Crisis, when Britain, France and Israel jointly invaded Egypt but were countered by the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. There are rumours that Israel intends to finance the construction of another canal at the north-western end of the Red Sea and, when the opportunity arises, sideline the Suez Canal.
The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Indian Ocean and is the main route through which the Gulf’s oil and gas resources reach global markets. The outbreak of the current US–Israeli–Iranian conflict subjected the strait to a dual blockade, causing energy prices to nearly double in the short term. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, between Somalia and Yemen, connects the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean. In addition to pirates from Somalia and other countries, Houthi drones and missiles also operate in the area. The Houthis are core members of the Iran-backed “Arc of Resistance”, so blockades of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz often occur in tandem.
When Saudi crude oil cannot be shipped through the Strait of Hormuz, it can be transported westwards through domestic pipelines and loaded onto tankers on the Red Sea coast. But because of the Yemeni Houthis’ control over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, these tankers must detour via the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and southern Africa before crossing the Indian Ocean to Asia, adding almost 10,000 nautical miles and another month to the voyage.
The Strait of Malacca connects the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea. It is currently jointly managed by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, and is the narrow passage on which China’s maritime shipping depends most heavily. If the strait were blocked, shipping would have to divert through other straits in Indonesia and neighbouring countries, such as the Lombok Strait, Makassar Strait and Sunda Strait. To overcome the “Malacca dilemma” [马六甲之困], China previously planned the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. Judging from its progress so far, however, this overland route can only provide a very limited solution.
The Taiwan Strait, to the north-west of China’s Taiwan Island [我国台湾岛], connects the South China Sea with the East China Sea. Its role as a maritime passage is not particularly significant in itself, but a deep ocean trench lies to the south-east of Taiwan Island, whereas the Bohai Sea and East China Sea are both relatively shallow. The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea. If China were to establish a strategic nuclear-submarine base on the eastern side of Taiwan Island, its strategic nuclear submarines could enter the Pacific with a high degree of stealth. This is also one of the considerations underlying the US military’s close attention to the Taiwan issue.
The Bashi Channel, between Taiwan Island and the Batanes Islands [north of Luzon in the Philippines], is the most important passage between the South China Sea and the Pacific. It has major value for shipping as well as important military significance, and is a key maritime chokepoint in East Asia’s so-called “first island chain”.
Turkey’s Bosporus and Dardanelles straits connect the Black Sea with the Mediterranean, and are a maritime lifeline for Ukraine and other areas along the Black Sea coast, alongside being part of the territory of Turkey, a NATO member. The straits are therefore under NATO control. The reason that the Varyag aircraft carrier [the Kuznetsov-class carrier which became the Liaoning following renovations] was so cheap when we purchased it was that the Ukrainian side was firmly convinced that such a large military vessel could never pass through the straits into the Mediterranean. [Note: The claim about the Ukrainian side could not be substantiated, although Turkey had initially signalled that it would block the inoperative vessel from being towed through the Bosphorus on the grounds of a collision risk, only allowing the passage of the “floating fun palace“ after extensive negotiations with China]. They did not expect the Chinese to somehow turn a disaster into a miracle and get the carrier through. In the eventuality that NATO one day dissolves, passage through the straits may become easier.
The Arctic shipping route has become one of the major geostrategic issues attracting close attention from the major powers in recent years. As the climate warms and icebreaking capabilities improve, the Arctic Ocean can become an important Eurasian shipping route during the summer. Russia is seeking to use its icebreaking capabilities to control Arctic shipping routes, while Europe and the United States are both seeking to secure a share for themselves by virtue of their geographical proximity.
The Bering Strait, which controls access to the Arctic shipping routes, is controlled on either side by Russia and the United States. Once Arctic shipping is fully opened up in the future, it will become a critical chokepoint on the shortest routes between Europe and Asia, and between Asia and the Americas, as well as a key focus of competition among the major powers.
The Panama Canal connects the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. If it were cut off or brought under control, shipping from Asia to Latin America, the east coast of North America, eastern Canada, Brazil and the Caribbean would have to divert around the Strait of Magellan at the southern tip of the Americas, adding thousands of miles and several weeks to the journey.
The Strait of Gibraltar, which connects the Mediterranean with the Atlantic, the Danish straits, which form the Baltic Sea’s only outlet to the ocean, and the English Channel, which lies between the British Isles and the European continent, have all played a very important role in the history of European warfare.
In addition to straits and canals, there are many important islands and ports that have a major bearing on the global contest for sea power. These include Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, China’s Taiwan Island, the Ryukyu Islands under US and Japanese control, Greenland near the Arctic, Hawaii and Guam in the middle of the Pacific, the Andaman Islands facing the western entrance to the Strait of Malacca and Scarborough Shoal close to the Philippines. These islands either command key shipping routes or serve important functions as strategic bases.
Some natural deep-water ports are likewise strategically significant for understanding the shape of future geopolitical struggles. This is particularly true of a series of ports in which China has invested heavily in recent years, including Chancay Port in Peru, Ream in Cambodia, Kyaukphyu Port in Myanmar and Gwadar Port in Pakistan. All are potential focal points of future geopolitical struggle.
III. Technological Change Is Weakening the Advantages of Sea Power
The world is like a chessboard, with every game bringing a new situation [世事如棋，局局新]. Technological change is an important force driving historical transformation. Different eras have different technological conditions, and geostrategic calculations therefore often differ greatly as well.
Improvements in shipbuilding capabilities and the accumulation of astronomical and geographical knowledge made the Age of Exploration possible, and the importance of sea power gradually came to outweigh that of land power. The development of aviation and nuclear technology then meant that superiority in air power and nuclear weapons came to outweigh naval superiority and became the focus of the superpower arms race in the twentieth century. Therefore, when considering the security of maritime routes in the twenty-first century, we cannot ignore the impact of the latest technological changes.
First is the impact of drone technology. Drones and missiles are becoming increasingly integrated: their ranges are increasing, costs falling, systems becoming more intelligent, payloads growing and speeds rising. Advances in drone and missile technology have given some small and medium-sized countries, and even non-state actors such as the Houthis, a limited capability to confront major sea powers. US aircraft carriers have to pull back deep into the Indian Ocean; otherwise, they are vulnerable to saturation attacks by Iranian and allied drones and missiles. Yet once US aircraft are operating a thousand miles or more from the Iranian coast, their combat capabilities are greatly diminished. The advantage of sea power over land power has therefore been substantially weakened.
Second is the impact of satellite remote-sensing technology. Another major advantage of sea power over land power lies in its ability to achieve surprise and its mobility. But as remote-sensing technology develops and becomes more widespread, land powers have a relatively good chance of ascertaining the disposition and movements of an adversary’s naval forces. Of course, China and the United States currently enjoy an overwhelming lead in satellite remote-sensing capabilities, but both can share intelligence and information to give friendly countries access to the capabilities of their satellite remote-sensing systems. This further weakens sea power’s advantages of mobility and surprise over land power. Aircraft-carrier fleets and even submarines can be tracked for extended periods by an adversary using remote sensing.
IV. How Should China Respond to the Coming Sea-Power Challenge?
First, compromise, retreat and avoidance offer no way forward.
Some argue that there is no need to confront the Americans head-on at sea. Instead, we can solve the problem by developing overland transport, replacing the Maritime Silk Road with the overland Silk Road, which can reach Europe, Asia and Africa. But if we examine the issue quantitatively rather than qualitatively, it is not difficult to see that this would likely be nowhere near sufficient to solve the issue of our international trade routes. In terms of weight, the China–Europe Railway Express carries about as much freight in an entire year as Ningbo Port handles in two days. The two are simply not on the same order of magnitude.
[Note: The comparison appears to slightly understate the current volume of China-Europe rail freight, but the point still stands—maritime traffic is vastly more significant in quantitative terms.]
Moreover, maritime transport essentially operates “in parallel” [并联], whereas overland transport operates mainly “in series” [串联]. If one shipping route is impassable, all that happens is that ships take a longer route, adding some time and freight costs. But if a railway linking Europe and Asia is blocked by any one of the countries along its route, the entire rail service becomes difficult to keep running.
The lesson of the German Empire under Bismarck on the question of sea power was a profound one. The Germans believed that they should be satisfied with continental hegemony, avoid competing with Britain and France for colonies around the world and avoid challenging Britain at sea. Even under the ambitious Kaiser Wilhelm II after 1890, German naval development was subject to a “70 per cent principle” on the development of the German navy, meaning that its total tonnage should not exceed 70 per cent of Britain’s.
[Note: Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz designed his “Risk Theory” on the premise that if Germany maintained a 2:3 ratio of ships to Britain, the costs of engaging with the German fleet would be unacceptable to Britain.]
Even after the outbreak of the First World War, Germany still did not fully commit itself to fighting Britain to the finish at sea. The result was that the Imperial German Navy, then the world’s second-largest by total tonnage, was not destroyed in naval battle with Britain, but instead ended up ignominiously scuttling itself in its own harbour.
[Note: The German fleet was scuttled at Scapa Flow in Scotland while interned by Britain.]
As of 2026, when this article is being written, the shift in sea power between China and the United States has not yet been completed. In terms of the size of its navy, China is now drawing level with and beginning to overtake the United States: it has already surpassed the US in the number of naval vessels, but not yet in total tonnage. In terms of the technological level of its equipment, China is also beginning to overtake the United States, but the PLAN still lags behind in experience and capabilities. In the bilateral balance of power, China is on the verge of surpassing the United States, but once the US alliance network and its 800 overseas military bases are taken into account, we are still far from having done so.
[Note: A 2024 Congressional Research Service review counted at least 128 overseas bases, but broader non-governmental estimates have placed the figure much higher, at around 750.]
The Anglo-Saxon peoples have controlled sea power for nearly three hundred years. This is not something we can wrest from them through a three-day decisive battle or a three-month diplomatic offensive. We will probably need around thirty years, advancing step by step, to secure control over and rights of access to ports, straits, canals and shipping routes across the world. Until then, we should attach great importance to the possibility that some of our import and export trade dependent on maritime transport may come under threat or even suffer partial disruption.
The foundations of sea power include expanding and upgrading naval equipment in both quality and quantity, as well as gradually establishing a global network of supply bases through sustained diplomatic and military efforts. Beyond these tangible foundations, there are also two intangible ones. The first is collective consciousness: a new national consensus must be forged around a series of propositions. The future of the Chinese nation [中华民族] does not lie solely in one corner of East Asia. Retreat and conservatism cannot bring peace or respect. Only by embracing the oceans, conquering the oceans and regaining command [重掌] of the oceans can the Chinese nation have a future.
The second is the flow of funds. A cycle linking military expenditure, mercantile activity and public finance must be established. In other words, a substantial proportion of the returns generated through global trade and investment should contribute to public finances, while fiscal resources should in turn provide long-term support for the expansion of military spending. This requires consensus and cooperation between government departments, the military and the private business sector.
The descendants of the dragon [龙的子孙] shall ultimately rule the stars and the waves [星辰大海].
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Changes Unseen, Strategies Uncharted | Digest: August 2026
Today’s digest is published in collaboration with Bill Bishop’s one-and-only Sinocism.
The Bismarck/Tirpitz comparison is the sharpest part of this for me — a naval power deliberately capping itself at 70% of the dominant power's tonnage specifically to avoid triggering an existential confrontation it wasn't ready to win, then still ending up scuttling its own fleet at Scapa Flow regardless. Di is arguing China should avoid that same restraint and go all-in on chokepoint control instead, but the German case he cites doesn't actually resolve which strategy works — restraint didn't save Germany from war, but neither did it cause the war either. Worth noting how often 21st-century strategists reach for early-20th-century naval competition as their reference point, when drone and satellite technology may be dissolving the entire sea-power-versus-land-power framework this whole essay is built on.