Briefing: Trump's National Security Strategy
An analysis of reactions by China's establishment intellectuals to the new US National Security Strategy
Today’s briefing draws on a body of more than thirty articles and is followed by a short selection of views—representative, thought-provoking, or otherwise notable.
Executive Summary
The NSS is widely read—by Chinese and Western analysts alike—as strategic narrowing: an abdication of the US “global policeman” role and a step back from overt global hegemony.
Where they diverge is on causality and intent. Western analysis tends to diagnose ideological abdication, while Chinese commentary more often frames the shift as recalibration under decline, overreach and finite power.
The dominant mood in Chinese commentary is caution rather than triumphalism.
A few see a fleeting “Trump opportunity period”, but many warn that retrenchment could generate turbulence and instability.
A leading strand argues the retreat is not real at all, but instead “strategic retrenchment” is designed to let the US recuperate, rebuild and return later with greater capacity.
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A related view sees a shift in the method of hegemony: softer rhetoric and fewer explicit threats paired with a deeper commitment to long-term competition.
Some authors even argue that Trump’s fixation on European identity might eventually strengthen alliance cohesion, reframing the China contest by replacing values with civilisational identity.
Although China is named less aggressively, intent is judged unchanged. Beijing is repeatedly warned not to mistake toned-down language for reduced pressure.
The “Western Hemisphere first” move has prompted speculation about a transactional carve-up, though most dismiss this as rumour. More commonly, it is read as a repackaging of sphere-of-influence logic.
NATO is expected to reshape rather than collapse: costs shift to Europe while US control persists, and some anticipate a harder, identity-based mobilisation that could sharpen alignment against China.
Chinese and Western analyses broadly agree that the NSS marks a narrowing of US strategy and an abdication of America’s role as global policeman—or, as one Chinese commentator puts it, a “deliberate renunciation of America’s role as a global hegemon” (主动放弃了美国的全球霸权角色).
Where they diverge is on causality and intent. While Western commentary tends to treat the shift as ideological abdication, Chinese authors more often frame it as a necessary recalibration in the face of decline and overreach—a recognition of the “finite nature of American power” (承认美国力量有限).
The dominant tone is caution rather than triumphalism. Some pieces do flag a “Trump opportunity period” (特朗普机遇期), while a few others warn that even partial US retrenchment could produce “violent turbulence” (剧烈动荡). The striking feature, though, is that many simply do not believe the retreat is real.
One major strand reads the NSS as “strategic retrenchment” (战略收缩): a period in which the US recuperates and rebuilds, laying the foundations for a later counterattack. One author explicitly likens this to a Nixon–Reagan sequence during the Cold War. A related view suggests the retreat is in name only: a shift in the method of hegemony, characterised by the US “reining in its aggressive language” (收敛了攻击性词汇).
While noting the toned-down language on China, nearly all the authors caution Beijing against mistaking softer wording for softer intent—one argues it is “aimed at China everywhere, just less explicit” (处处针对中国，只是不那么直白).
Even those who anticipate some stabilisation in US—China relations argue that Washington will keep applying pressure indirectly through its allies. Another suggests a more naked, value-stripped contest may prove harsher over the long run, with the game shifting from an “American football game” to a “marathon” (从“美式橄榄球赛”到“田径马拉松”). Many authors also approvingly note the NSS’s use of the term “near-peer competitor” (同级对手) to describe China, treating it as evidence that strategic retrenchment reflects an acknowledgement of Chinese power.
The “Western Hemisphere first” move has prompted some speculation about a transactional great-power “Yalta 2.0” (雅尔塔2.0)—a world “carve up” (瓜分)—but this is usually treated as rumour rather than something anchored in the NSS itself. More commonly, commentators argue the strategy still rests on “sphere-of-influence thinking” (势力范围思路) and, in that sense, is simply “different soup, same medicine” (换汤不换药).
Multiple pieces argue NATO will not collapse but will enter a prolonged reshaping, with the burden shifting to Europe while the US retains control. Several frame this as a shift from a “values alliance” (价值同盟) to a “cost alliance” (成本同盟). A minority view does, however, hold that expecting allies to subordinate themselves to US national interests is fantasy (同盟体系服从美国家利益是幻想).
More than one author also argues that Trump’s fixation on European identity might eventually strengthen alliance cohesion, reframing the China contest by replacing an “ideological threat” (意识形态威胁) with a “civilisational threat” (文明威胁). In this theory, “civilisation” becomes an organising principle for the US and its allies—potentially more coherent, and more aggressively mobilised against China, than a looser values-based alliance.
Another reason many commentators resist reading the NSS as a clean break with older US threat-framing on China is that they see it as a compromise text—closer to a “strategic hotchpotch” (战略性大杂烩) than a coherent doctrine. The fingerprints of rival camps remain visible, most clearly in the Taiwan and Indo-Pacific passages, where “Western Hemisphere first” coexists with insistence on maintaining military deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. Several pieces add that, whatever the paper says, implementation is uncertain and likely to be uneven and messy.
On whether the NSS will make America stronger—or hasten decline—the body of texts is split. The larger camp reads it as “strategic self-rescue” (战略自救), framed elsewhere as an American version of China’s “hide your strength, bide your time” doctrine (韬光养晦). A second camp, however, argues the ambition–means gap is fatal: US power is “on a downward trend” (不断下滑) and the strategy will “accelerate America’s decline” (加快美国的衰落进程).
Overall, Chinese commentary on the NSS differs substantially from Western analysis. It is less critical, for a start. Although it sees symptoms of US decline everywhere, it tends to treat the NSS not as a moment for celebration—China’s strategic rival renouncing its crown—but as a potentially dangerous turn in the US–China relationship. (Bibliography)
— Jacob Mardell
Selected Articles
1. Jin Canrong
Takeaway: Trump’s new NSS is not “conceding” to China—Washington is trying to shed burdens, squeeze allies, and refocus on the Western Hemisphere while quietly hardening deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
Name: Jin Canrong (金灿荣)
Position: Wu Yuzhang Chair Professor, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (RUC); Director, Centre for China’s Foreign Strategy Studies, RUC
Source: Guancha (12 Dec. 2025)
Trump’s NSS signals “America First” retrenchment: it attacks Biden’s previous strategy, prioritises homeland security and Western Hemisphere primacy, shifts costs onto allies in Europe/the Middle East/Africa, and sharpens its focus on a “Greater Indo-Pacific”.
The China line is contradictory: China is treated as a near-peer and economic pragmatism resurfaces, yet tech controls, investment screening and military deterrence remain central; allied participation in containing China is expected to persist and may intensify.
US–China relations are periodised as “compete-and-cooperate” from 1972 to 2017, then full-spectrum competition since late 2017, and now stalemate; the contest centres on domestic stability, AI advantage and coalition-building, with Taiwan the most dangerous flashpoint.
Jin: “We should of course take this federally mandated document seriously, but we needn’t overinterpret it, because it only represents the US government’s policy direction for the next four years.”
2. Jian Junbo
Takeaway: Transatlantic alliance survives, but shifts from liberal unity to a transactional, populist-aligned bloc under US primacy.
Name: Jian Junbo (简军波)
Position: Director, Centre for China-Europe Relations, Fudan University
Source: The Paper (11 Dec. 2025)
The NSS signals the end of a liberal, values-based Atlantic community, shifting towards a “non-liberal alliance” (非自由主义联盟). Trump-era rifts—tariffs, pressure over Huawei, hints about Greenland and US–Russia talks on Ukraine—have widened, and Vance’s Munich broadside points to an “ideological chasm” (巨大鸿沟).
Europe is not blameless: it treated US protection as automatic, yet also weakened Washington through the euro, defence-market autonomy, digital-sovereignty agendas and persistent trade surpluses. The NSS implies the US will prioritise Western Hemisphere primacy and squeeze allies to offset lost rents.
Still, the alliance is unlikely to break. Europe needs US security and access to its largest market, and European leaders keep paying court. Trump may also re-cement ties by courting European populists. The likely outcome is greater strategic autonomy, diversification towards the Global South and renewed multilateralism.
Jian: “As populist forces in Europe irreversibly gain greater influence over decision-making—and even take power in many countries—the transatlantic alliance will be re-fortified around a new ideological consensus.”
3. Meng Weizhan
Takeaway: Trump “retrenchment” masks a cheaper, longer anti-China strategy—involving the creation of a “civilisational” bloc with Europe.
Name: Meng Weizhan (孟维瞻)
Position: Lecturer and Research Fellow, Institute for Advanced Study in Social Sciences, Fudan University
Source: Greater Bay Area Commentary (9 Dec. 2025)
The NSS’s “softened” China tone is tactical: China/Indo-Pacific is deprioritised on paper, but the underlying goal—containment—doesn’t change.
The real shift is method: a more “cost-effective” (性价比) and durable long-term competition, grounded in domestic consolidation, reduced external costs and greater burden-shifting to allies.
The decisive battleground becomes economics (经济是决胜点) and frontier technologies—AI, quantum, biotech—through the rebuilding of industrial and defence capacity to widen the capability gap over time.
A “civilisation” framing and courting of European populists aim to re-knit a tighter Western bloc. China should not relax in response, but instead move faster to resolve its own domestic problems.
Meng: “The underlying tone of America’s China strategy does not change: maintaining its own position of advantage, and guarding against and containing China’s rise. Simply discussing how many times the word ‘China’ appears in the document is, in fact, of little significance. The new NSS is actually aimed at China throughout; it is just less explicit. We should see through this confusing surface appearance and clearly recognise its strategic intent.”
4. Sun Liping
Takeaway: With the NSS, a centuries-old “West” is vanishing—the document crystallises the “East rises, West declines” narrative.
Name: Sun Liping (孙立平)
Position: Professor (retired), Department of Sociology, Tsinghua University
Source: “立平坐看云起” (7 Dec. 2025)
The NSS crystallises the “East rises, West declines” narrative (东升西降): the “West” (西方)—not just a word, but a centuries-old reality—is disappearing.
The West is cultural and institutional rather than geographic: Europe plus the US and Canada, and Australia and New Zealand. Cold War additions include Japan and Israel, while Russia and parts of Central Europe remain liminal.
The NSS drops the “West” in favour of a “Western Hemisphere” (西半球)—a geographic frame that signals Trumpian retrenchment and “America First”, with Europe shifting from inside to outside this camp.
Sun: “Most worth noting is this: Europe used to be within the West, but it is now outside the Western Hemisphere. As for what that implies, we can explore it further when there is time.”
5. Shen Yi
Takeaway: The NSS dresses up strategic retreat as toughness.
Name: Shen Yi (沈逸)
Position: Professor, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University; Director, Cyberspace Governance Research Centre, Fudan University
Source: Guancha (10 Dec. 2025)
The NSS is an incoherent patchwork of three camps: the strength-and-deterrence camp (实力-威慑派), isolationists (孤立主义派) and zero-sum transactionalists (零起点的交易派).
Its core move is to junk the post-Cold War “neoliberal global hegemony ideal” (新自由主义全球霸权理想) in favour of blunt, material national-interest politics: publicly scolding allies, downgrading Middle East primacy, softening moral judgement on Russia and Ukraine, and replacing governance agendas with bilateral leverage and deals.
The report’s loud Monroe Doctrine turn is tough-guy rhetoric masking real contraction—an attempted “backwards offensive” (向后进攻) that signals a shift from global primacy to Western Hemisphere primacy, even though a regional geopolitical posture cannot realistically sustain global financial hegemony.
Still, the military chapters read like global-hegemony doctrine: nuclear and conventional primacy, an Indo-Pacific focus, denial capability inside the First Island Chain and continued Taiwan deterrence. The missing piece is execution capacity, which may signal turbulence and uncertainty ahead.
Shen: “Ultimately, at least on paper, the strategic path it charts is this: abandon the neoliberal-driven global hegemonic ideal of recent decades while retaining some symbols and benefits of traditional hegemony, and reset the goal to a dignified, orderly strategic retreat.”
6. Liu Zhaojia
Takeaway: The NSS signals tactical easing towards China, but containment will persist and the strategy remains riven with contradictions.
Name: Liu Zhaojia (刘兆佳)
Position: Emeritus Chair Professor of Sociology, Chinese University of Hong Kong; Adviser, National Association for Hong Kong and Macao Studies
Source: Bauhinia Magazine (15 Dec. 2025)
The NSS is a factional mishmash that dresses up strategic retreat as toughness: Monroe Doctrine rhetoric masks contraction, while unresolved domestic tensions and weak execution raise the risk of sharper global turbulence.
The document’s only real “clarity” is its repudiation of the post-1945, post-Cold War “liberal internationalist” order. Beyond that, it is muddled and internally contradictory.
The contradictions—especially on China—stem from factional compromise and a split among US strategists: many still see America as broadly ahead, while a growing camp views China as a peer or “near-peer competitor” (同级对手) whose core interests must be acknowledged.
There are signs of tactical easing: a tariff and trade truce after US escalation backfired, talk of rebalancing trade towards non-sensitive areas, less explicit framing of China as the top challenge and a turn towards the Western Hemisphere.
Yet it would be dangerous for Beijing to infer abandonment of containment. The NSS still seeks allied mobilisation to constrain China economically, technologically and militarily. US policy continues to target China, remains chaotic, risks isolation and may accelerate US decline.
Liu: “Regrettably, the only clarity and stability in this document lies in the Trump administration’s overturning of the so-called liberal internationalist order that the United States built after the Second World War—especially after the Cold War—and long championed; in all other respects it is extremely unclear, even rather chaotic.”
7. Huang Jing
Takeaway: Trump’s NSS abandons liberal hegemony, but intensifies China-focused economic competition.
Name: Huang Jing (黄靖)
Position: Specially Appointed Professor, Shanghai International Studies University (SISU); Director, Institute of American and Pacific Regional Studies, Shanghai Institute for Global Governance and Regional and Country Studies
Source: Shanghai Institute for Global Governance and Regional Studies (18 Dec. 2025)
The NSS’s organising idea is the “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine” — ditch Wilsonian liberal internationalism, accept diminished global primacy, retrench militarily to lock down the Western Hemisphere, and rebuild US power through economic competition.
Alliances no longer “support” US security: partners are burdens and bargaining chips. Europe is scolded for allowing “political correctness” to erode its culture. Values and ideology recede, replaced by “flexible realism” (灵活的现实主义)—and allies panic.
The Indo-Pacific chapter is “messy but malign” (看似混乱但却包藏祸心): it reasserts the First Island Chain (第一岛链) and Taiwan’s role, while shifting costs to Japan, Korea and Australia via arms sales—using Taiwan as leverage and raising the risk of escalation.
Russia is downplayed; India is courted. China is framed as a “near-peer competitor” (几乎对等的竞争者) in economic rivalry, while Washington prioritises war-avoidance to “recuperate” (休养生息). Beijing should exploit the opening and push a finance-focused “grand deal” (大交易) with Trump.
Huang: “China must seize the opportunities brought by the Trump administration’s major adjustment of its security strategy, to lay a solid foundation for stabilising China–US relations and for promoting China’s continued ‘becoming stronger’. If China and the United States reach a ‘grand agreement’ as the Trump administration demands, then China must first require the United States to make clear that it recognises and accepts the legitimacy of China’s political system.”