Briefing: Takaichi Sanae and China–Japan Relations
An analysis of reactions by China's establishment intellectuals to Takaichi Sanae's recent statement that an attack on Taiwan could trigger the deployment of Japan's self-defence forces.
Today’s briefing draws on a body of more than seventy articles and is followed by a short selection of views—representative, thought-provoking, or otherwise notable.
Executive Summary
Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s 7 November comment that a Taiwan conflict could threaten Japan’s “survival” triggered a huge, ongoing wave of commentary in China.
Analysts stress continuity: her rhetoric fits a long trend of Japanese remilitarisation and “historical revisionism” driven by right-wing forces.
Specific motives are debated, from factional politics and right-wing populism to personal conviction.
Official messaging argues that her comments undermine: 1) China–Japan bilateral relations as captured by the “four political documents”; 2) the regional security order; and 3) the post-1945 international order.
Commentary combines confidence that a declining Japan cannot match China’s industrial weight with a pessimistic view that, although off-ramps exist, Tokyo is unlikely to change course; only a few voices are more sanguine.
Many argue the US will resist being dragged into a Japan-led Taiwan conflict, but analysis is split between “Japan as America’s attack dog” and “Japan pulling a reluctant US into the Pacific”.
Most Chinese analysts judge Beijing’s response as appropriate, with some arguing it should go further; Japanese militarism is widely portrayed as responding only to strength.
Fringe nationalist commentary spells out alarming “policy options”, including a revision of China’s nuclear doctrine to allow a first strike against Japan.
The broader policy menu focuses on rules-based “legal diplomacy”, calibrated economic pressure, and a more visible PLA presence; the goal is to convince Japanese elites that an anti-China line is structurally untenable.
A notable recurring proposal is to “play the Ryukyu card” by supporting Okinawa-based indigenous and anti-base claims as structural leverage over Japan.
Chinese commentary on Sino–Japanese relations has surged since Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae linked a Taiwan conflict to a “situation threatening Japan’s survival” on 7 November.
Although Beijing’s off-ramp is tied to a retraction, Chinese writers place this episode within a broader indictment of Takaichi’s policy choices. Her apparent readiness to loosen Japan’s “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” is treated with particular alarm.
Several authors tie her language back to the 1930s, arguing that invoking an impending “existential crisis” (存亡危机) to justify external aggression is a habitual trick of Japanese militarism. Across the spectrum — from People’s Daily’s “Zhong Sheng” editorials to think-tank scholars and fringe commentators — Takaichi’s remarks are framed as evidence of a dangerous shift towards Japanese remilitarisation and “historical revisionism” (历史修正主义) driven by right-wing forces (日本右翼势力).
Interpretations of Takaichi’s Motivations
On Takaichi’s motivations, Chinese commentary is mixed but converges on three broad explanations. First, a large cluster casts her as an intra-LDP power player propped up by the hard right and populist mobilisation, willing to mortgage Japan’s long-term interests for personal gains and to over-compensate for perceived weakness as a female leader. A second line situates her rise against the global backdrop of growing right-wing populism and economic malaise in liberal democracies. A third takes her at her word, seeing a politician acting on long-standing ideological convictions and fast-tracking a deliberate strategy of remilitarisation.
There is a noticeable tension between portraying Takaichi’s remarks as merely the latest step in a long rightward drift and justifying Beijing’s forceful response. Most authors stress continuity but insist that “saying the quiet part out loud” is still unprecedented in post-war Japan.
Implications for Sino-Japanese Relations and Regional Security
The official narrative — echoed by many commentators — describes the impact of Takaichi’s remarks at three levels: China–Japan relations, regional security in East Asia and the post-war international order. On the bilateral level, a number of authors reference the “four political documents” (中日四个政治文件) that underpin post-1972 China–Japan ties. On the international level, authors call for strengthening China’s “discourse power” (话语权) by persuading third countries that Beijing is defending the post-1945 world order.
Beyond outrage, the dominant sentiment is confidence. Writers repeat the foreign ministry’s warning that “those who play with fire will get burned” (玩火者必自焚). Again and again, colourful — and often quite violent — imagery is deployed to hammer home the futility of Japan’s actions. A favourite metaphor likens Japan’s attempt to obstruct unification to “a mantis raising its arms to stop a chariot” (螳臂当车).
Running through it all is a narrative of Japanese decline — a weakening power lashing out but ultimately doomed in the face of overwhelming Chinese strength. The commentary converges on continuity rather than rupture and, like much of China’s official historical discourse, it is strongly teleological. Both Japan’s imperial past and China’s current strength are framed as rooted in industrial capacity, which mirrors a central conviction in Chinese economic thinking.
Part of this confidence rests on readings of US politics. Several authors argue that an “America First” administration would resist being dragged into a Japan-driven Taiwan conflict. Anticipating a US–China détente, more than one commentator even casts Japan as China’s new primary rival.
The texts are less coherent on agency in the US–Japan alliance. One narrative — especially among hardline commentators — casts Japan as the United States’ “attack dog” (鹰犬). A more fringe variant sees a US attempt to prepare a proxy war against China. A second narrative, more prominent in policy-focused pieces, treats the crisis as Japan-driven — Takaichi leveraging a manufactured crisis to drag the US into a Taiwan contingency and lock in Japan’s own remilitarisation.
Prognosis and China’s Policy Options
On China’s response, most commentators judge Beijing’s reaction as appropriate, with some arguing it should go further. The dominant view is that the gravity of the Taiwan question demands a tough line. A recurrent motif in this corpus — echoing wider Chinese analyses of the West — is that post-war Japanese elites share a Social Darwinist outlook and only respond to displays of strength.
On the prognosis, the tone is broadly pessimistic. Commentators echo foreign ministry talking points that it is in Japan’s own interest to step back, though nobody expects Tokyo to cooperate and some of China’s more hawkish voices clearly relish the fight.
Still, the debate is not monolithic. A small group of more sanguine commentators emphasise pluralism within Japan and argue that shifting power balances will eventually force the right wing to recognise that their hardline anti-China policies are unsustainable.
Fringe nationalist voices spell out some alarming “policy options”. One argues that if Japan intervenes in a Taiwan war, China would be justified in bombing the Yasukuni Shrine, pre-empting Japan’s nuclear facilities and annihilating its navy. Another contends that China’s only viable option now is to revise its nuclear doctrine to allow a first strike against Japan. These voices are not representative but they are useful for mapping the outer edges of the Overton window.
The rest of the corpus sketches a coherent and fairly granular policy menu. Diplomatically, several authors call for moving from ad hoc “moral diplomacy” (道德外交) to rules-based “legal diplomacy” (法治外交), with pre-announced penalties for crossing red lines.
Economically, the emphasis is on calibrated pressure. Commentators advocate targeted, constituency-specific measures using regional “white” and “black” lists for trade in strategic goods — deliberately squeezing LDP strongholds while easing pressure on more China-friendly regions. Other proposed tools include export controls on rare earths. Militarily, many call for a more visible and persistent PLA presence around Japan.
Echoing the broader view that Takaichi’s remarks reflect a deeper structural shift, one author explicitly argues that economic countermeasures should be escalatory and sustained, with the goal of convincing Japanese elites that an anti-China line is structurally untenable.
Of particular interest is a recurrent call to “play the Ryukyu card” (打出“琉球牌”), meaning systematic Chinese support for Okinawa-centred indigenous-rights claims. The “Ryukyu card” is framed as a long-term pressure point on Japan to mirror Tokyo’s use of the Taiwan question.
Overall, the tenor of the debate strongly supports Western assessments that we are in for a long and turbulent period in China–Japan relations.
— Jacob Mardell
Selected Articles
1. Lü Yaodong and Ju Jiaying
Takeaway: Post-war Japanese “historical revisionism” is a deliberate right-wing effort to deny colonial aggression and overturn the post-war system, including Japan’s “peace constitution”.
Names: 1. Lü Yaodong (吕耀东); 2. Ju Jiaying (鞠佳颖)
Positions: 1. Professor, University of CASS; and Researcher, Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS); 2. Assistant Researcher, Institute of Japanese Studies, CASS
Source: Northeast Asia Forum (July 2025)
Note: An orthodox account of Japan’s “historical revisionism”, originally published in July to coincide with the 80th anniversary of the World Anti-Fascist War – long before Takaichi came to power. This essay offers the clearest academic statement of how Beijing views efforts to “correct” the post-war system (战后体制).
Post-war Japanese “historical revisionism” (历史修正主义) is a negative, denialist project that whitewashes colonial aggression, recasts Japan from “perpetrator” (“加害者”) into “victim” (“受害者”), and serves as a core component of right-wing ideology (日本右翼势力意识形态的重要组成部分).
Its main expressions are textbook sanitisation and denial of the “comfort women” system, repeated visits by politicians to Yasukuni Shrine, and diplomatic narratives (Hiroshima/Nagasaki, Sado mines, etc.) that export a cleansed history and normalise Japan’s self-image as a victim rather than an aggressor.
The deeper goal of this historical revisionism is to “correct” the post-war system (“修正”“战后体制”) and hollow out the Peace Constitution (“和平宪法”), so that Japan can re-emerge as a political–military great power (政治军事大国) and “state that can fight” (“能战国家”), a trajectory that drives political rightward drift and threatens regional stability.
Lü and Ju: “It can be expected that, as the LDP’s conservative administrations and right-wing forces continue to deepen their cooperation, ‘historical revisionism’ will accelerate their constitutional-revision agenda, constantly tearing open historical narratives in order to ‘correct’ the post-war system.”
2. Yang Bojiang and Wu Xian
Takeaway: Takaichi, a standard-bearer of Japan’s new militarism, is leveraging the Taiwan contingency to fuel populism and an arms build-up.
Names: 1. Yang Bojiang (杨伯江); 2. Wu Xian (吴限)
Positions: 1. Director and Party Deputy Secretary, Institute of Japanese Studies, CASS; and Director, CASS East China Sea Research Centre; 2. Associate Research Fellow, Institute of Japanese Studies, CASS
Source: “破圈了” WeChat account (16 Nov. 2025)
Takaichi links a “Taiwan contingency” (台湾有事) to a Japanese “survival crisis situation” (存亡危机事态), which is a naked threat of military intervention in the Taiwan Strait and a step towards a new “war abyss” (战争深渊).
This revives pre-war militarist logic—invoking national “life-or-death crises” to justify aggression—and weaponises Abe’s 2015 “new security laws” (新安保法).
Takaichi is a core representative of “new Japanese militarism” (日本新型军国主义), fusing hard-right conservatism with history revisionism (历史修正主义).
Propped up by a fragile “minority government” (少数派政权) and right-wing populism (民粹主义), she prioritises constitutional revision and arms build-up (修宪扩军)—including revising the “three security documents” (安保三文件)—while neglecting inflation, inequality and structural reform.
Resource-poor Japan’s real interests lie in cooperative development with China and regional peace.
Yang and Wu: “History may resemble the past, but it will not repeat itself indefinitely. What will not repeat is an era in which the Chinese nation and the peoples of other Asian countries can be trampled upon at will; they now have the strength and capability to safeguard their national sovereignty and interests. What will be similar is that Japan’s right-wing forces and militarist warmongers, who pin their hopes of reviving an imperial dream on constant sabre-rattling, will be eternally nailed to the pillar of historical shame.”
3. Xiang Haoyu
Takeaway: Takaichi’s remarks are a deliberate, four-fold breach of Japan’s legal and political commitments on Taiwan.
Name: Xiang Haoyu (项昊宇)
Position: Specially Appointed Researcher, Department for Asia-Pacific Studies, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS)
Source: Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy and China’s Diplomacy in the New Era (21 Nov. 2025)
Takaichi’s statements embody “four major errors” (四大错误) in law: they deny the Cairo and Potsdam settlement on Taiwan, betray the 1972 Joint Communiqué and 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty, violate UN Resolution 2758 and basic non-interference norms, and trample Articles 9 and 98 of Japan’s own constitution.
These errors generate “three overlapping harms” (三重危害): they dismantle the political and legal foundations of China–Japan relations, make Japan a direct accelerator of Taiwan-Strait tensions and regional arms racing (including flirting with nuclear options), and erode the core anti-aggression principles of the post-1945 order.
A firm Chinese response—“seeking peace through struggle” (以斗争求和平则和平存)—is therefore necessary; the onus now lies entirely on Takaichi’s cabinet to pull back from “using Taiwan to contain China” (以台制华) or face steadily escalated counter-measures and costs.
4. Zheng Yongnian
Takeaway: Takaichi’s comments are right-wing posturing; shifting hard-power dynamics mean “reunification” with Taiwan is inevitable as US power retreats and an ageing, crisis-prone Japan slides into long-term decline.
Name: Zheng Yongnian (郑永年)
Position: Founding Director and X.Q. Deng Presidential Chair Professor, the Institute for International Affairs, Chinese University of Hong Kong (Shenzhen)
Source: Greater Bay Area Review (17 Nov. 2025)
Note: Zheng Yongnian, a moderate and one of China’s most prominent prominent public intellectuals, downplays the material significance of Takaichi’s rhetoric, stressing domestic political drivers and the diversity of opinion in Japan.
Taiwan is a non-negotiable sovereignty issue: “definition power” (定义权) must rest with Beijing, unification is historically inevitable, and others’ approval is irrelevant; China decides timing and method.
Shifting international realities weaken Taiwan’s leverage: Western democracies are dropping the “democracy—authoritarianism” frame and US power and willingness to fight over Taiwan is eroding.
Takaichi’s comments are right-wing posturing from a declining, ageing Japan; real hard-power trends ensure eventual mainland-led “unification”, but ordinary Japanese are not the enemy.
Zheng: “Of course, it also needs to be pointed out that Japan is not monolithic [一体的]: many ordinary people have reflected very deeply on war, and we should not see every Japanese person as a right-winger like Takaichi Sanae [这样的右派]—there are also many who want to promote friendship between China and Japan.”
5. Chairman Rabbit
Takeaway: Takaichi’s comments are political theatre for Japan’s domestic right, yet they tie Japan to a losing, anti-China bet made due to an outdated understanding of the US.
Name: Ren Yi (任意)
Position: Ren Yi, better known by his pen name Chairman Rabbit (兔主席), is a well-connected Chinese political commentator and a “red third-generation” princeling, the grandson of reform-era CCP elder Ren Zhongyi (任仲夷).
Source: Chairman Rabbit’s WeChat account (11 Nov. 2025)
Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks are staged domestic theatre for LDP conservatives and nationalist voters that helps burnish her hawkish leader image (鹰派领导人形象).
As a woman in a highly male-dominated conservative ecosystem, she embodies “compensatory toughness” (补偿性强硬), out-hawking male rivals.
In reality Japan is only a “dog” the US has let off the leash (美国放出来的一条“狗”), unable to fight over Taiwan without its “master”
Under Trump’s “America First” (美国优先) this makes her front-line anti-China posturing both reckless and classic “pig teammate” (猪队友) behaviour.
6. Chen Ping
Takeaway: China’s indulgent postwar Japan policy let Japanese militarism revive; Beijing should abandon moralism and adopt hard deterrence, even decisive military strikes.
Name: Chen Ping (陈平)
Position: Senior Researcher, China Institute, Fudan University; Adjunct Professor, School of Economics, Fudan University; Retired Professor, National School of Development, China Centre for Economic Research, Peking University
Source: Sina News 新浪新闻 (13 Nov. 2025)
Note: Chen Ping is best seen as a more extreme nationalist voice, useful for signalling where the edges of the Overton window sit. He argues:
Takaichi’s rise confirms Japan’s “wolf and lapdog” dual national character (双重国格)—servile before US/Russia, but bullying a “weak” China.
US/USSR’s brutal punishment forged Japan’s slavish obedience, while China’s forgiving postwar policy (以德报怨) only encouraged contempt and revived militarism (军国主义).
Because Japanese society believes it lost to the US/USSR, not China, China is widely seen as weak and easy to bully (软弱可欺).
If Japan revises its peace constitution and intervenes over Taiwan, China should be ready to strike symbols like Yasukuni (靖国神社) and key Japanese bases.
Chen Ping: “If Japanese forces dare to interfere with China’s reunification of Taiwan, or create conflict over the Diaoyu Islands or in the Taiwan Strait, then Japan’s naval fleets will be completely annihilated [完全消灭] and its naval and air bases in the Ryukyu Islands destroyed, in order to settle the historical debt of the First Sino-Japanese War [报复甲午战争的历史欠债].”
7. Li Wei & Yan Yizhou
Takeaway: Japan’s repeated failure to develop its own commercial jets shows that a country cannot re-arm without an independent high-end industrial base
Names: 1. Li Wei (李巍); 2. Yan Yizhou (阎奕舟)
Positions: Wu Yuzhang Distinguished Professor, Vice Dean of the School of International Studies, Vice Dean of the Institute of Regional and Country Studies; and Director of the Centre for US Studies, Renmin University of China (RUC); 2. Master’s student, School of International Studies, RUC
Source: Beijing Cultural Review (Oct. 2025)
Note: Li Wei and Yan Yizhou provide a particularly detailed analysis of Japan’s faltering aeronautics sector and what this industrial weakness implies for Tokyo’s military ambitions:
Japan’s repeated failure in commercial airliners exposes a structural weakness in its bid to re-arm.
Japan’s aviation industry has been locked into a US-dominated supplier roll due to its lack of whole-aircraft integration capabilities, too small a home market and lack of diplomatic clout required to win foreign orders.
Long-term technological reliance on the US, misreading of market saturation in regional jets, and huge financial pressures turned Japan’s renewed “commercial jet dream” (商飞梦) into a 15-year, loss-making fiasco.
China’s COMAC programme must treat these as hard warnings. With C909 and C919 just entering commercial service, China must stick to an “only forward, no retreat” (只可进、不能退) strategy: pursue independent R&D and localisation across the supply chain and using its vast domestic market plus Southeast Asian and developing-country demand to secure a true great-power aviation industry.
8. Jin Canrong
Takeaway: Takaichi’s comments mark a qualitatively dangerous escalation in Japan’s right-wing, remilitarising drift, so China must respond firmly but not extremely.
Name: Jin Canrong (金灿荣)
Position: Wu Yuzhang Chair Professor, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (RUC); Director, Centre for China’s Foreign Strategy Studies, RUC
Source: “金金乐道” WeChat Account (18 Nov. 2025)
Takaichi is the first post-war Japanese leader to openly link a “Taiwan contingency” (台湾有事就是日本有事) with exercising collective self-defence (集体自卫权), potentially justifying Japanese intervention in a (re)unification war and even flirting with abandoning the “three non-nuclear principles” (无核三原则).
China must respond firmly but not go to extremes (不走极端) — using diplomatic, economic and military signalling plus the “Ryukyu status unresolved” line (琉球地位未定论) to curb Japan’s right-wing remilitarisation (军国主义思想) and test the real limits of US backing.
9. Gao Zhikai & Cai Zhengyuan
Takeaway: Takaichi’s remarks violate Japan’s unconditional surrender and China should remind Japan of its defeated status, making both Japanese elites and the public pay a tangible price.
Names: 1. (Victor) Gao Zhikai (高志凯); 2. Cai Zhengyuan (蔡正元)
Positions: 1. Vice President, Center for China and Globalization (CCG); Guest Professor, School of Law, Soochow University; 2. Taiwanese politician from the Kuomintang (KMT), also known as Alex Tsai.
Source: Guancha 观察 (19 Nov. 2025)
Takaichi’s “Taiwan contingency” line is virtually a declaration of war, violating Japan’s unconditional surrender (无条件投降), peace constitution (和平宪法), and UN “enemy state clause” (敌国条款).
China should shift from “moral diplomacy” (道德外交) to “legal diplomacy” (法治外交): including pre-announced entry bans for any senior figure visiting the Yasukuni shrine, treating such acts as automatic triggers for sanctions.
Economic levers should bite: 100% rare-earth embargo, long-term bans on key seafood/agri imports, and slashing Chinese tourism/visa-free access so that Japanese voters feel the pain and blame LDP hawks. Strategically, China as war victor (战胜国) should step up PLAN patrols around Japan, draw a red line on Japanese nuclearisation as a “moment of destruction” (毁灭时刻), and use the Ryukyu issue (琉球问题) to hem in revived militarism.
10. Lian Degui
Takeaway: Takaichi’s remarks violate Japan’s unconditional surrender and China should remind Japan of its defeated status, making both Japanese elites and the public pay a tangible price.
Name: Lian Degui (廉德瑰)
Position: Director, Japan Research Centre, Shanghai International Studies University (SISU); and Professor, School of Japanese Studies, SISU.
Source: Guancha 观察 (24 Nov. 2025)
Takaichi’s talk of a “Taiwan contingency” (台湾有事) and “existential crisis situation” (存亡危机事态) simply repeats Abe’s playbook, but misreads a China that, since the 3 September 2015 V-Day parade, has moved to a much harder, faster-paced line on Taiwan.
Beijing no longer accepts vague “policy unchanged” (立场未变) formulas; it now demands explicit withdrawal of wrongful statements on Taiwan.
Tourism and seafood measures are only first-stage pressure; China can escalate to high-tech inputs and rare earths.
Takaichi’s polling boost reflects “not bowing to China” (不向中国低头) and economic hopes, not deep support for her Taiwan stance.
China should target sanctions at Takaichi and pro-Taiwan right-wingers (亲台右翼), letting Japanese conservatives prove their hardline China policy is unsustainable.
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